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CONDITIONAL FEDERAL GRANTS: CAN THE 
GOVERNMENT UNDERCUT LOBBYING BY 
NONPROFITS THROUGH CONDITIONS PLACED ON 
FEDERAL GRANTS? 
Amy E. Moody* 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.1 
To compel a man to furnish funds for the propogation of ideas he disbe-
lieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannicaJ.2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Each year the United States government grants billions of dollars 
in federal funds to a variety of organizations.3 The authority for this 
massive spending comes from Article I, § 8 of the Constitution: "The 
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States .... "4 
* Managing Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 U.S. CaNST. amend. 1. 
2141 CONGo REC. S10,543 (daily ed. July 24,1995) (position paper of the Heritage Foundation 
quoting Thomas Jefferson). 
3141 CONGo REC. H8389 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Istook). The latest figures 
available show that in 1990, more than 40,000 organizations received over $39 billion in govern-
ment grants. Id. Whether one characterizes the United States as a "welfare state" or a "mixed 
economy" is largely a matter of rhetoric. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending 
and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1103--04 (1987). The fact of the matter is that the 
United States government expends an enormous amount of federal funds on a variety of 
organizations. See 141 CONGo REC. H8389 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
4 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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Although current popular political views5 call for severe cutbacks 
in federal funding, the dependence of states and private organizations 
on federal funding makes this funding necessary.6 The reality of this 
massive federal spending is that many private organizations, espe-
cially nonprofit organizations, depend on federal money for their sur-
vival,7 Because of this need, the federal government has recognized 
that by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds, the gov-
ernment can influence the conduct of recipients.s Often, the federal 
government attempts to change or otherwise influence the conduct of 
the recipients that the government could not otherwise constitution-
ally regulate.9 
The federal government is, however, subject to limits on its spend-
ing power.lO The following limits restrict governmental powers inher-
ent in the spending power: (1) the expenditure must promote the 
public welfare;l1 (2) any conditions imposed through the spending 
power must not be ambiguous;12 (3) the conditions must reasonably 
relate to the purpose of the expenditure;13 and (4) the legislation 
5Jason DeParle, Rant, Listen, Exploit, Learn, Scare, Help, Manipulate, Lead, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 1996, § 6, at 34. House of Representatives Majority Leader Newt Gingrich has led a 
recent "revolution" aimed at getting government out of the lives of citizens. I d. As a part of this 
political campaign, debates about cutting federal spending have been in the forefront. Id. In 
fact, partisan debates about this very issue led to government shutdowns during the 104th 
Congress. Id. 
6 Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1104. Although many private for-profit organizations depend on 
federal money and are affected by some of the legislation that this Comment discusses, this 
Comment focuses on the effect of the legislation on nonprofit organizations. There are approxi-
mately 1,400,000 nonprofit organizations in the United States. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN 
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 14 (1995). In 1990, nonprofits employed 8,700,000 paid 
employees and had 5,800,000 volunteer employees-l0.4% of the work force in the United 
States. Id. Government funds and benefits such as contracts account for 25.8% of the resources 
of nonprofit organizations. Id. at 14-15. 
7 Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1104. 
8Id. at 1125-26. 
9Id. at 1104. 
10 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); Stephen N. Sher, The Identical 
Treatment of Obscene and Indecent Speech: The 1991 NEA Appropriations Act, 67 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1107, 1138-39 (1991). 
11 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976). What constitutes the "general welfare" has 
been broadly interpreted by the courts. Id. As the Supreme Court stated in Buckley: "Appel-
lants' 'general welfare' contention erroneously treats the General Welfare Clause as a limitation 
upon congressional power. It is rather a grant of power, the scope of which is quite expansive, 
particularly in view of the enlargement of power by the Necessary and Proper Clause." I d. 
12 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
13 See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). 
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cannot violate any constitutional rights of the recipient. I4 This Com-
ment focuses on the fourth limitation to the federal spending power 
and explores in what situations the government can condition federal 
spending upon the relinquishment of constitutionally protected First 
Amendment activity. 
In 1995, during its first session, the 104th United States Congress 
introduced two significant pieces of legislation seeking to restrict the 
lobbying activities of nonprofit organizations that receive federal 
funds. I5 The first piece of legislation introduced, the Simpson Amend-
ment, was signed into law by President Clinton as part of the Lobby-
ing Reform Act.I6 The Simpson Amendment forbids all lobbying ac-
tivitiesl7 by nonprofit corporations that are organized under 
§ 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code and that receive federal 
funds. 18 The second piece of legislation aimed at restricting lobbying 
14 See Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985). 
15 See H.R. 2127, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1995) (initial version of Istook Amendment); 
Lobbying Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 1O~5, § 18, 109 Stat. 689, 703-04 (1995). Nonprofit organi-
zations rely on lobbying to bring their message to Congress. See Gary Lee, Environmental 
Groups Launch Counterattack After Losses on Hill, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1995, at A6. In 
particular, environmental groups have used lobbying to urge the passage or rejection of certain 
legislative initiatives. See id. Recently, Republicans have geared their agendas towards scaling 
back environmental laws and regulations. Id. The environmental lobby has responded to this 
anti-environmental agenda by focusing its resources on Capitol Hill. Id. Environmental lobby-
ists have been successful in stopping a bill that would have restricted the ability of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and other governmental agencies to regulate private industry. Id. 
In addition, environmental lobbyists have been instrumental in stopping Republican-led initia-
tives to cut back on the protections of the Endangered Species Act. See Rocky Barker, Endan-
gered Species Act Fight Stretches Into Fifth Year, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Jan. 3,1996, at A5. 
Environmental lobbyists will playa crucial role in the coming year as reform of the Endangered 
Species Act again takes center-stage. Id. The lobbying efforts of environmental groups are 
particularly important in overcoming the powerful lobbying efforts of big business. See Lee, 
supra, at A6. Big business lobbyists have been at the forefront of much of the recent anti-en-
vironmental legislation. See id. In California, a lobbying effort led by the state Chamber of 
Commerce, the oil industry, chemical companies, and public water agencies promoted bills aimed 
at cutting back on sections of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Dan Morain, Environmental Laws 
Under Siege, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at A3. 
16 See Pub. L. No. 10~5, § 18, 109 Stat. 689, 703-04. President Clinton signed the Lobbying 
Reform Act on December 19, 1995. Id. 
17 See irifra note 192 and accompanying text. 
18 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1995). Nonprofits have the ability to receive tax-exempt status by 
organizing under anyone of 27 provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. See id. §§ 501(c)(1)-
(23), 501(d)--(t), 521(a). Nonprofits organized under § 501(c)(4) are similar to other nonprofits but 
are more active in politics because of a lack of restrictions on their lobbying activities. See 
Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1663 n.45 (1992); 
see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(4); discussion infra notes 63-M and accompanying text. 
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by recipients of federal funds was the Istook Amendment.19 The Is-
took Amendment proposed to cut off federal funds to all federal grant 
recipients,20 including nonprofit corporations organized under both 
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code,21 that en-
gaged in "political advocacy"22 above a monetary threshold estab-
lished by the Amendment.23 Although the Istook Amendment is not 
law currently, versions of the Istook Amendment have passed both 
the House and Senate at different times.24 
Proponents of the Simpson and Istook Amendments argue that 
taxpayers should not be required to subsidize the lobbying activities 
of nonprofit groups whose agendas taxpayers may oppose.25 Oppo-
nents argue that federal funds do not subsidize lobbying by nonprofits 
because use of federal funds to lobby is already illegal.26 In addition, 
opponents argue that the legislation violates the First Amendment 
right to free speech27 and is motivated by a desire to "defund the 
left."28 
19 See Andrew Taylor, Istook Amendment's Wild Ride, CONGo Q., Nov. 11, 1995, at 3443 
(discussing different versions of the Istook Amendment). The Istook Amendment was intro-
duced by Representatives Istook (R-Okla.), McIntosh (R-Ind.) and Ehlrich (R-Md.) but is 
commonly known as the Istook Amendment. Id. There were several versions of the Istook 
Amendment offered as part of various pieces of legislation during the first session. See infra 
Section III.B and accompanying notes. The first version of the Istook Amendment was offered 
as part of the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services. 
See infra text accompanying notes 212-17. This Comment will discuss the original language of 
the Istook Amendment, as well as subsequent compromise language. 
20 Taylor, supra note 19, at 3443. Although the Istook Amendment covered all federal grant 
recipients, this Comment focuses on the effects of the Amendment on nonprofit organizations. 
21 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 59. Most nonprofit corporations are organized 
under § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4). Id. This Comment gives a full explanation of the nature of 
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations and the differences between them. See discussion infra 
Section II.A. 
22 Taylor, supra note 19, at 3443. The activities precluded by the Istook Amendment were 
characterized as "political advocacy." Id. This definition encompassed a broader range of activi-
ties than the activities precluded by the Simpson Amendment. See id.; infra notes 220-24 and 
accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. 
24 See Taylor, supra note 19, at 3443; infra text accompanying note 244 (discussing passage of 
House of Representatives version of the Istook Amendment); infra note 266 (discussing passage 
of Senate version of the Istook Amendment). 
25 See, e.g., 141 CONGo REC. S10,550 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl on the 
Simpson Amendment); 141 CONGo REC. H8390 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hyde 
on the Istook Amendment). 
26 See, e.g., 141 CONGo REC. S1O,557 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin). 
27 See, e.g., 141 CONGo REC. H8388 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Skaggs). 
28 See id. at H8391 (statement of Rep. Hastings: "This is clearly an attempt by Republicans 
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Regardless of the political rhetoric, there are serious First Amend-
ment implications to both the Simpson and Istook Amendments. This 
Comment argues that both pieces of legislation unconstitutionally 
force § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations that receive federal 
funds to choose either to continue receiving federal funds or to waive 
their constitutional right to free speech.29 
Section II of this Comment provides an overview of § 501(c)(3) and 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations.30 It outlines the limitations on lob-
bying by § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations prior to 
the enactment of the Simpson Amendment.31 In addition, Section II 
presents an overview of the United States Supreme Court decisions 
governing First Amendment issues and the limited ability of Con-
gress to condition governmental benefits on the relinquishment of 
constitutionally protected activities.32 Section III provides the legis-
lative histories and an overview of the substantive provisions of both 
the Simpson and Istook Amendments.33 Section IV analyzes the con-
stitutionality of both the Simpson and Istook Amendments in light of 
the case law discussed in Section 11.34 This section argues that the 
Simpson Amendment unconstitutionally conditions the receipt of fed-
eral funds on termination of the recipient organization's lobbying 
activities, an infringement of First Amendment rights.35 In addition, 
Section IV argues that the Istook Amendment, if enacted, would 
impermissibly condition the receipt of federal funds.36 The limitations 
that the Istook Amendment would place on an organization's lobbying 
activities would be so substantial that the Amendment would effec-
tively preclude organizations from engaging in 10bbying.37 
to stifl[e] the voice of the liberal-earthy-crunchy-labor-supporting-branola-eating individuals 
and organizations which devote themselves to making America a better place by utilizing their 
constitutionally mandated right to influence the political process."); A Lobbying Rule We Don't 
Need, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 27, 1995, at 4Q. 
29 See infra Section IV and accompanying notes. 
30 See infra Section II.A and accompanying notes. 
31 See infra Section II.A and accompanying notes. 
32 See infra Section II.B and accompanying notes. 
33 See infra Section III and accompanying notes. 
34 See infra Section IV and accompanying notes. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
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II. PRE-AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON LOBBYING 
BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
A. Section 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(J,,) Nonprofit Organizations 
and Pre-Amendment Limitations on Lobbying Activities 
Although nonprofit corporations organized under § 501(c)(3) and 
§ 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code both receive tax-exempt 
status,38 there are significant differences in the type of work that 
these organizations do and in the benefits and burdens that their tax 
status confers upon them.39 A comparison of the nature of § 501(c)(3) 
and § 501(c)(4) organizations illuminates these differences.40 
Commonly called "social welfare" organizations,41 § 501(c)(4) non-
profit corporations cannot be organized for profit and must be oper-
ated exclusively42 for the promotion of social welfare.43 Generally, an 
organization operates exclusively for the promotion of social welfare 
"if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common good 
and general welfare of the people of the community. An organization 
embraced within this section is one which is operated primarily for 
the purpose of bringing about civic betterments and social improve-
ments."44 
38 I.R.C. § 501(a) (1995). 
39 See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 18, at 165~5. 
40 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-(4). Although there are 25 other code provisions by which nonprofits 
organize, the analysis in this Comment is restricted to these two provisions. The simple reason 
for this is that the majority of nonprofit corporations organize under these provisions. See 
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 59. 
41 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 556. 
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(1) (1996). Although § 501(c)(4) requires organizations to be 
operated "exclusively" for the promotion of social welfare, this is satisfied if the organization is 
"primarily" engaged in promoting the social welfare. [d. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2). 
43 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). The tax code defines § 501(c)(4) organizations as: 
[d. 
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the 
promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership of 
which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular 
municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, 
educational, or recreational purposes. 
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2). As illustrated below, § 501(c)(4) organizations vary in their 
scope and purpose. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 18, at 
1663-64. An organization formed to operate an airport serving the general public and located 
on municipal land was deemed a social welfare organization. See Rev. Rul. 78--429, 1987-2 C.B. 
178. An anti-abortion group formed to educate the public about the dangers of abortion and to 
support legislative change to make abortion unconstitutional likewise qualified for § 501(c)(4) 
status. See Rev. Rul. 76-81, 1976-1 C.B. 156-57. In addition, an organization whose primary 
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Section 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporations are distinguishable from 
§ 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporations, which are commonly called "chari-
tables."45 Section 501(c)(3) "charitable" organizations cannot be oper-
ated for profit, and they must be organized and operated exclusively46 
for charitable activities.47 The charitable activities of § 501(c)(3) or-
ganizations make them more direct-service providing agencies than 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations.48 Section 501(c)(4) organizations, on the 
other hand, focus their energies on institutional change, mostly by 
attempting to shape public opinion and to influence the political proc-
ess.49 
There are additional differences between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) 
organizations. Although donors to § 501(c)(3) organizations are al-
purpose was to prevent oil spills and develop programs for containment and clean-up when the 
spills occurred qualified for § 501(c)(4) status. See Rev. Rul. 79-316, 1979-2 C.B. 228-29. 
45 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 310. 
45 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b). The regulations to § 501(c)(3) state that to meet the 
requirement that the organization be "operated exclusively," the articles of organization of the 
group: "(a) [Must] [l]imit the purposes of such organization to one or more exempt purposes; 
and (b) Do not expressly empower the organization to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial 
part of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more 
exempt purposes." Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(a)-(b). 
47I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The tax code defines "charitable" organizations as: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated 
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition 
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equip-
ment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. ... 
Id.; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 310. 
48 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 315 (stating that § 501(c)(3) organizations are 
classified for their tendency to provide public benefits that "relieve the burdens of government 
by providing goods or services that society or government is unable or unwilling to provide."). 
49 See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 18, at 1663-64. Com-
mentators have described the changing role of nonprofits, including § 501(c)(4) nonprofits as 
follows: 
Increasing numbers of nonprofit organizations have come to believe that the traditional 
beneficiaries of "charitable" activity are only incompletely served by activities that 
simply respond to individual problems which are overlooked, or even created by, the 
laws and public systems devised to address the needs of society's least fortunate. These 
organizations have turned their efforts to raising public awareness, demanding ac-
countability from governmental agencies, and pressing for changes in the law, all in an 
attempt to serve the collective interests of those whose needs are ill-served by the 
status quo. 
Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 
IND. L.J. 201, 204 (1988). Well known examples of § 501(c)(4) organizations include the Sierra 
Club, the Heritage Foundation and the League of Women Voters. Developments in the Law-
Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 18, at 1663-64. 
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lowed a tax deduction for their contributions,50 donors to § 501(c)(4) 
organizations are not allowed this benefit.51 In addition, there are vast 
differences between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations with re-
spect to restrictions on lobbying activities.52 The Internal Revenue 
Code places stringent lobbying restrictions on § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions as a condition of the benefits that they receive in the form of 
tax-exempt status and the ability of donors to the organizations to 
deduct contributions.53 Nonprofit corporations are allowed § 501(c)(3) 
status only if their lobbying activities fit within the tests imposed by 
Congress. 54 
There are two ways that § 501(c)(3) organizations may meet the 
tests imposed by Congress. First, organizations qualify for § 501(c)(3) 
status if "no substantial part" of their activities is related to lobby-
ing.55 Unfortunately, sufficient guidelines for the "no substantial part" 
test have "never been clearly articulated."56 The test, therefore, cre-
ates difficulties for organizations trying to determine to what extent 
50 See LR.C. § 170(a), (c)(2). 
51 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (stating that one 
of the principal differences between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations is the inability of 
donors to § 501(c)(4) organizations to take tax deductions for contributions to organizations). 
The reason that donors to § 501(c)(4) organizations are not able to deduct contributions is simply 
that Congress chose not to subsidize § 501(c)(4) organizations to the extent that it did other 
nonprofit organizations. [d. at 544. 
52 LR.C. § 501(c)(3). Qualification for § 501(c)(3) requires that the organization satisfy the 
following: 
[N]o substantial part of the activities [of the organization may be] ... carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, (except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including 
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
[d.; Regan, 461 U.S. at 543 (noting that additional difference between § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) 
nonprofit organizations is the freedom of § 501(c)(4) organizations to engage in substantial 
lobbying). 
53 See LR.C. §§ 170(a), 501(h). 
54 [d. § 501(c)(3), (h)(l). 
55 [d. § 501(c)(3), (h). Organizations do not qualify under the "no substantial part" test unless: 
"no substantial part of [their] activities ... is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, 
to influence legislation .... " [d. § 501(c)(3). An organization engages in "substantial" lobbying 
when it qualifies as an "action organization." See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3). An action 
organization is an organization that: "(a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a 
legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or (b) Advo-
cates the adoption or rejection of legislation." [d. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a)-(b). Legislation has 
been defined to include action by Congress, state legislatures, local governing bodies or by the 
public in a referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment or similar procedure. [d. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii). 
56 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 502. 
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they may engage in lobbying activity without risking their § 501(c)(3) 
status.57 As a result, many nonprofits elect to use the "expenditure 
test" embodied in § 501(h) of the Internal Revenue Code to be able 
to engage assuredly in lobbying activities and maintain their 
§ 501(c)(3) status.58 The "expenditure test" denies tax-exempt status 
to organizations that make lobbying or grass roots expenditures59 in 
excess of their lobbyingii° or grass roots "ceiling amounts."61 In addi-
57 I d. at 504. 
58 See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 524-25; Open Letter to 
Eligible Charities Regarding the 501 (h) Election, 51 TAX NOTES 655, 655 (May 6, 1991) (reprint-
ing open letter signed by seventeen prominent attorneys and academics recommending § 501(h) 
election to insure compliance with lobbying limitations within § 501(c)(3». 
59 See I.R.C. § 4911(cHd). The Internal Revenue Code defines lobbying expenditures as 
"expenditures for the purpose of influencing legislation." Id. at § 4911(c)(1). The Code further 
defines influencing legislation as: 
(A) any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions 
of the general public or any segment thereof, and (B) any attempt to influence any 
legislation through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, 
or with any government official or employee who may participate in the formulation 
of the legislation. 
Id. § 4911(d)(1). The term "influencing legislation" does not include: 
(A) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research; (B) pro-
viding of technical advice or assistance (where such advice would otherwise constitute 
the influencing of legislation) to a governmental body or to a committee or other 
subdivision thereof in response to a written request by such body or subdivision, as 
the case may be; (C) appearances before, or communications to, any legislative body 
with respect to a possible decision of such body which might affect the existence of the 
organization, its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contribu-
tions to the organization; (D) communications between the organization and its bona 
fide members with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to 
the organization and such members, other than communications described in para-
graph (3); and (E) any communication with a government official or employee, other 
than-(i) a communication with a member or employee of a legislative body (where 
such communication would otherwise constitute the influencing of legislation), or (ii) a 
communication the principal purpose of which is to influence legislation. 
[d. § 4911(d)(2)(A)-(E). Grass roots expenditures include all activities that are within the 
definition of "influencing legislation" with the exception of paragraph (B). [d. § 4911(c)(3). 
60 [d. § 501(h)(2)(B). The lobbying ceiling amount is 150% of the lobbying nontaxable amount 
for the year. [d. The lobbying nontaxable amount is the lesser of either $1,000,000 or an amount 
calculated as follows. [d. § 4911(c)(2). If the exempt purpose expenditures are not over $500,000, 
the lobbying nontaxable amount is 20% of the exempt purpose expenditures. [d. If the exempt 
purpose expenditures are over $500,000 but not over $1,000,000, the lobbying nontaxable 
amount is $100,000 plus 15% of the excess of the exempt purpose expenditures over $500,000. 
[d. If the exempt purpose expenditures are over $1,000,000 but not over $1,500,000, the lobbying 
nontaxable amount is $175,000 plus 10% ofthe excess of the exempt purpose expenditures over 
$1,000.000. [d. If the exempt purpose expenditures are over $1,5000,000, the lobbying nontax-
able amount is $225,000 plus 5% of the excess of the exempt purpose expenditures over 
$1,500,000. Id. 
61 [d. § 501(h)(2)(D). The grass roots ceiling amount is 150% of the grass roots nontaxable 
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tion, § 501(h) election requires organizations to report lobbying ex-
penditures annually.62 
In contrast, the Internal Revenue Code imposes no lobbying re-
strictions on § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations.63 In fact, most 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations engage in significant lobbying activity.64 
Significantly, the lobbying restrictions in both the Simpson and 
Istook Amendments, or lack thereof as the case may be, refer only to 
the use of private funds for lobbying activities by nonprofit organiza-
tions.65 Both § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations are 
already barred from lobbying with federal funds.66 Violations of the 
amount for the year. [d. The grass roots nontaxable amount is 25% of the lobbying nontaxable 
amount. [d. § 4911(c)(4). 
62 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 532. Section 501(h) election requires an organization 
to file a Form 990 detailing lobbying and grass roots expenditures. [d. This requires extensive 
work for the organization: 
[d. 
[R]eporting requirements require an electing organization to adopt a relatively sophis-
ticated accounting system, allocating expenditures and general overhead to the direct 
and grassroots lobbying categories. This is no small chore, particularly because many 
expenditures may be difficult to categorize. Organizations that lobby should require 
employees to keep detailed time records so that their salaries and benefits can be 
properly allocated. Expenses for facilities, publications, and other activities should be 
apportioned on some reasonable basis. Failure to keep careful records will cause 
difficulties in the event of an audit. 
63 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983). 
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1996). The IRS has specifically acknowledged that "action 
organizations" qualify for § 501(c)(4) status. [d.; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv) (defining 
"action organizations" as having the following characteristics: "(a) Its main or primary objective 
or objectives (as distinguished from its incidental or secondary objectives) may be attained only 
by legislation or a defeat of proposed legislation; and (b) it advocates, or campaigns for, the 
attainment of such main or primary objective or objectives as distinguished from engaging in 
nonpartisan analysis, study, or research and making the results thereof available to the public."); 
see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 543 (stating that § 501(c)(4) organizations are allowed to engage in 
substantial lobbying activity). 
65 See Lobbying Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 18, 109 Stat. 689, 703--04 (1995). Because 
the language in the Simpson Amendment covers all funds of § 501(c)(4) organizations, the 
Amendment implicitly includes the private funds of organizations. See id. In addition, the 
language of the Istook Amendment also implicitly includes private funds. See Ehrlich Proposal 
Not Worth Harm It Would Do, BALT. SUN, Dec. 19, 1995, at 16A (noting that the Istook 
Amendment restricts the use of private funds). 
6618 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994). The federal code states: 
No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress shall, in the absence 
of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay for any 
personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, 
or other device, intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of Con-
gress, to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by 
Congress, whether before or after the introduction of any bill or resolution proposing 
such legislation or appropriation; but this shall not prevent officers or employees of the 
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law against the use of federal funds to lobby carry severe fines and 
possible criminal prosecution.67 Proponents of both the Simpson and 
Istook Amendments have been unable to uncover any evidence of 
abuse by nonprofits.68 The federal law, therefore, distinguishes be-
tween the use of private funds by § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organi-
zations and the use of federal funds by these same groupS.69 
B. Summary of First Amendment Case Law 
1. Nonprofit Organizations That Receive Federal Funds Retain 
Fundamental Constitutional Rights 
Organizations have no right, per se, to federal funds.70 The receipt 
of federal funding by an organization represents only a discretionary 
privilege or benefit bestowed by the government.71 There are limits, 
however, to the government's discretion in awarding these privileges 
or benefits.72 In awarding federal funds, some conditions are necessary 
Id. 
United States or of its departments or agencies from communicating to Members of 
Congress on the request of any Member or to Congress, through the proper official 
channels, requests for legislation or appropriations which they deem necessary for the 
efficient conduct of the public business. 
ffl Id. The federal code describes the penalties as follows: 
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or 
agency thereof, violates or attempts to violate this section, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and after notice and hearing by 
the superior officer vested with the power of removing him, shall be removed from 
office or employment. 
Id. Although 18 U.S.C. § 1913 creates government-imposed penalties, the statute does not 
create a private cause of action for individuals wishing to sue under the statute. See National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Campbell, 654 F.2d 784, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that Con-
gress did not intend to create private cause of action when enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1913). The 
Istook Amendment, however, creates a private cause of action against organizations violating 
its commands. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33. 
68 See Nan Aron, Q: Should Congress Limit Lobbying by Nonprofit Groups that Receive 
Federal Grants?; No: The Bill will Silence the Voices of NonProfit Citizen Advocates, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1995, at 19 (noting that four hearings held by the House Government and 
Oversight Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs failed to unearth evidence of abuse of federal 
moneys). 
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 1913. 
70 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
71 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (stating that 
Congress, in its discretion, may chose which activities to subsidize); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 10.01(2) (1994) (dis-
cussing government ''privileges''). 
72 See Regan, 540 U.S. at 545 (stating that "the government may not deny a benefit to a person 
because he exercises a Constitutional right."); Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
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for efficiency in disbursing the federal funds.73 Analyzing the propri-
ety of the government's discretion in awarding funds requires a de-
termination of whether the conditions assessed for qualification are 
"classifying" or "coercive."74 
When the conditions imposed by the government for receiving 
federal funds are beyond the control of the recipient, this type of 
condition is "classifying."75 "Classifying" conditions function to define 
the categories of eligibility for federal grants.76 Administrative 
efficiency demands that in order to be eligible for the receipt of federal 
funds, it is necessary that the organization or individual meet these 
"classifying" conditions.77 "Coercive" conditions, on the other hand, 
function to influence or discourage activity by the organization or 
individual receiving the federal funds.78 While "classifying" conditions 
are necessary for the orderly administration of the federal grant 
system, "coercive" conditions are often policy statements that force 
recipients to comply with the political ideology of the party in office.79 
Determining whether the requirement imposed by the government 
as a condition of federal funds is either "classifying" or "coercive" is 
often elusive.so 
73 Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1114. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. Professor Rosenthal uses the following example. The government has created a 
statute that provides financial aid for students. [d. One condition for the financial aid is that the 
assets and income of the students not exceed a certain statutorily set limit. [d. This is a 
classifying condition because the assets and income of the student at the time that they apply 
for the funding are beyond the control of the recipient. [d. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1114. Professor Rosenthal extends his hypothetical. A 
coercive condition to the financial aid would be a requirement that any student receiving aid 
not advocate for nuclear disarmament. [d. This requirement would have the coercive effect of 
discouraging students from protesting nuclear war so that they could receive federal funding 
for their education. [d. 
79 See id.; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (stating 
that government regulation forbidding editorializing by publicly funded broadcast stations was 
designed "to limit discussion of controversial topics and thus to shape the agenda for public 
debate."). Because many organizations rely on federal funds for their survival, "coercive" 
conditions raise an issue of consent. In the past, "coercive" conditions have been upheld on the 
theory that if the organizations do not like the condition, they can simply elect not to take the 
money. See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947); Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923). 
80 See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1115-16 n.54. Professor Rosenthal states that the boundaries 
between coercive and classifying conditions are often difficult to delineate. [d. at 1115. For 
example, a classifying condition that financial aid be given to only male students would be 
discriminatory although there is no coercive element and the condition is not within the control 
of the recipient. [d. In addition, financial aid that would only be given to students with a certain 
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Organizations that receive federal funds do, however, retain impor-
tant constitutional rights, including the First Amendment right to 
free speech.81 Generally, the First Amendment protects all types of 
speech, not just political speech.82 The First Amendment does not, 
however, give absolute protection to all speech.83 Exactly what types 
of speech will be protected under the First Amendment depends on 
the content of the speech and the reasons that the speech is being 
suppressed.84 Articulating exactly what types of speech will be pro-
tected by the First Amendment is difficult given the enormity of 
circumstances in which First Amendment issues arise.85 For example, 
courts have created different tests for First Amendment protections 
involving prior restraints,86 speech in schools,87 commercial speech88 
and labor situations.89 
The United States Supreme Court explicitly has recognized that 
lobbying is a constitutionally protected activity under the First 
Amendment.9o In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, the Supreme Court held that there was no violation 
of the Sherman Act91 where a group of railroads, a railroad association, 
grade point average would be valid even though it "coerces" students to improve their academic 
skills. [d. Professor Rosenthal argues that although compartmentalizing coercive and classifying 
conditions is difficult, usually the division between the two can be made by common sense. See 
id. at 1116 n.54. 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
82 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (stating that it is "immaterial whether the 
beliefs sought to be advanced ... pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters."); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (stating that "[fjreedom of discussion, if it would 
fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is 
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their 
period."); SMOLLA, supra note 71, § 2.05(3). 
83 See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (stating that the First Amendment 
does not give absolute protection to all possible uses of speech). 
84 See SMOLLA, supra note 71, § 3.01(2)(a)-(b). For example, the standard of review of First 
Amendment activity varies depending on whether the regulation imposed is content-neutral or 
content-based. [d. Content-based regulation is subject to strict scrutiny by the courts while 
content-neutral regulation is subject to a more intermediate level of scrutiny. [d. 
85 [d. § 3.03(2), at 84 (discussing the difficulty of describing modern First Amendment juris-
prudence). 
86 [d. § 8. 
87 [d. § 10.04. 
88 [d. § 12. 
89 SMOLLA, supra note 71, § 12.06. 
90 See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 552 (1983) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 
137-38 (1961). 
91 See Eastern R.R., 365 U.S. at 135-36. Generally, the Sherman Act forbids trade restraints 
and monopolies. [d. 
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and a public relations firm petitioned the government for laws relating 
to trucking weight limits and higher tax rates for heavy trucking.92 
The Supreme Court based its reasoning, in part, on the fact that the 
"right to petition [the government] is one of the freedoms protected 
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to 
Congress an intent to invade these freedoms."93 
2. The Speiser-Perry Model 
The Supreme Court specifically has recognized that the govern-
ment cannot condition benefits on restrictions of constitutionally pro-
tected First Amendment activity.94 In Speiser v. Randall, California 
enacted a state constitutional provision that required honorably dis-
charged veterans of World War II who claimed a veterans property 
tax-exemption to sign an oath of loyalty to the United States govern-
ment and the State of California.95 The Supreme Court found that 
conditioning receipt of a tax-exemption upon this oath of loyalty was 
an unconstitutional limitation on free speech.96 Denial of the tax-ex-
emption to those who refused the oath would have the effect of 
coercing recipients into refraining from speaking out against the gov-
ernment.97 The Court rejected the idea that because a tax-exemption 
is a discretionary "privilege" or "bounty," limitation on this "privi-
lege" cannot be a First Amendment violation.98 Implicitly emphasizing 
the retention of constitutional rights that beneficiaries of federal 
benefits receive, the Court reasoned that legislative bodies cannot do 
through their spending power what they cannot constitutionally do 
outside of this power.99 Thus, because Congress could not abridge 
First Amendment rights by making laws, neither could it do so by 
placing restrictions on the money it allocated. lOo 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court in Perry v. Sin-
dermann also held that the government could not attach conditions 
to the receipt of benefits that it could not impose constitutionally 
through its rule making powers.101 The respondent in Perry argued 
92 See id. at 129. 
931d. at 138. 
94 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958). 
951d. at 514-15. 
96 ld. at 519. 
971d. 
981d. at 518. 
99 See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518. 
100 See id. 
101 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
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that he had been denied the benefit of renewal of his teaching position 
at a state junior college because he had become active in an organiza-
tion critical of the college administration.102 The Supreme Court found 
that if the respondent was denied the governmental benefit of a 
contract to teach at a state college because of First Amendment 
activity, this denial was unconstitutional because it "penalized and 
inhibited" free speech. loa The Court again emphasized that recipients 
of federal benefits retain constitutional rights.104 Like the Speiser v. 
Randall Court, the Perry Court specifically stated that the govern-
ment cannot condition the receipt of federal benefits upon the relin-
quishment of constitutionally protected activities. lOS According to the 
Court: "[The government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-espe-
cially his interest in freedom of speech. . . . [T]his would allow the 
government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command di-
rectly."'l06 
The Court's focus in both Speiser and Perry was to preclude the 
government from regulating activities through its spending power 
that it could not constitutionally regulate if there were no federal 
funds involved.107 The United States Supreme Court expressed this 
same theme in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California. lOB In 
this case, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a 
federal statute similar in content to the Istook and Simpson Amend-
ments.109 The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967110 created the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit corporation that disbursed 
federal funds to noncommercial radio and television stations.lll A 
provision in the Act prohibited any television or radio station receiv-
ing these federal funds from editorializing.ll2 The Court found that the 
102 [d. at 594-95. 
103 [d. at 597-98. The lower court had granted summary judgment against the respondent on 
the theory that because respondent had no contract with the college at the time of his termina-
tion and because the college did not have a tenure system, he had no cause of action against the 
college. [d. at 595-96. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court, therefore, 
had no information on which to conclude whether or not respondent had been denied a new 
contract because of his First Amendment activities. [d. at 596, 598. 
104 See id. at 597. 
106 [d. 
106 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958». 
107 See id. at 597; Speiser, 357 U.S. 513, 518. 
!OB See 468 U.S. 364, 385 n.16 (1984). 
109 See id. at 370 n.7; infra Sections III.A-B. 
110 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99 (1994). 
III See League a/Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 366. 
112 [d. at 370 n.7. Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 read: "No noncommercial 
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precluded activity, editorializing, deserved special First Amendment 
protections and stated that: 
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Con-
stitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint 
or fear of subsequent punishment .... Freedom of discussion, if it 
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all 
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable 
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their pe-
riod.l13 
Because of the special nature of the First Amendment activity, the 
Court balanced the governmental interests in restricting the activity 
and whether the statute was narrowly tailored to meet these needs 
against the infringement on First Amendment activity.114 
The Court specifically rejected the interests advanced by the gov-
ernment,115 finding that the statute instead was intended to prevent 
the use of taxpayer moneys in activities that taxpayers may not 
support.116 The Court found that: 
[V]irtually every congressional appropriation will to some extent 
involve a use of public money as to which some taxpayers may 
object. Nevertheless, this. does not mean that those taxpayers 
have a constitutionally protected right to enjoin such expendi-
tures. Nor can this interest be invoked to justify a congressional 
decision to suppress speech.ll7 
In addition, the Court found that the statute was not tailored nar-
rowly because it encompassed many types of speech that did not 
address specifically the governmental interest asserted.l1s Because 
educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation under subpart C 
of this part may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting station 
may support or oppose any candidate for political office." [d. Although the statute restricted 
political campaign activity, the Court did not address this issue. [d. at 371. 
113 [d. at 381--82 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101--02 (1940)). 
114 [d. at 383. 
115 [d. at 385--86. The Court noted that the governmental interests implicated were the 
ability to: 
[P]rotect noncommercial educational broadcasting stations from being coerced, as a 
result of federal financing, into becoming vehicles for the Government propagandizing 
or the objects of governmental influence; and, second, to keep these stations from 
becoming convenient targets for capture by private interest groups wishing to express 
their own partisan viewpoints. 
[d. at 384--85. 
116 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 385 n.16. 
117 [d. (citation omitted). 
118 [d. at 392-93. 
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the Court found that the only governmental interest implicated was 
prevention of the use of federal funds for activities that taxpayers 
mayor may not agree with, and because the statute was not narrowly 
tailored, the Court held the statute unconstitutional.1l9 The Court was 
again asserting that the government could not regulate through its 
spending power what it could not constitutionally regulate inde-
pendent of its spending power.120 
3. The "Subsidy" Cases 
Although the Supreme Court has found that the government can-
not condition the receipt of federal funds upon the waiver or relin-
quishment of constitutional rights,121 some restrictions imposed by the 
government as a condition of governmental benefits have been up-
held.l22 In Cammarano v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service denying 
tax deductions for expenditures made for lobbying efforts did not 
present a First Amendment question.123 The petitioners were not 
denied a tax deduction because they engaged in constitutionally pro-
tected speech.l24 Instead, the denial of the deduction amounted only 
to a requirement that the petitioners pay for their lobbying activities 
out of their own pocket.125 The Court emphasized that Congress had 
simply made a discretionary decision that because "purchased public-
ity can influence the fate of legislation which will affect, directly or 
indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the community should 
stand on the same footing as regards its purchase so far as the Treas-
ury of the United States is concerned."126 
Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, indicated that the result would 
have been different if all "ordinary and necessary" business deduc-
tions were denied to anyone who engaged in lobbying and not just 
those deductions that represented lobbying activities.127 The above 
scenario, Justice Douglas found, would place a penalty on certain 
119 [d. at 384-85, 392-93. 
120 See id. at 385--86 n.16. 
121 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 
(1958). 
122 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983); 
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959). 
123 See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 512-13. 
124 [d. at 513. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. 
127 See id. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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forms of speech, putting the case into the Speiser model whereby the 
government was regulating activity that it could not otherwise con-
stitutionally regulate.l28 
Following Cammarano, the Supreme Court decided Regan v. 
Taxation With Representation of Washington. l29 In Regan, the Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of the prohibition of "substantial lobby-
ing" by nonprofits organized under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.130 The Court held that the prohibition on "substantial lob-
bying" in the tax code did not violate the First Amendment. 131 
Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR), a nonprofit or-
ganized to lobby Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary, 
sought tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).132 The Internal Revenue 
Service denied § 501(c)(3) status to TWR because "a substantial part 
of [petitioner's] activities would consist of attempting to influence 
legislation .... "133 TWR claimed that the denial of § 501(c)(3) status 
because of its lobbying activities was an unconstitutional violation of 
its First Amendment rights because it placed an "unconstitutional 
condition"l34 on its ability to receive tax deductible contributions.135 
The Court, however, held that the prohibition against lobbying in the 
tax code was not a First Amendment violation.1OO By excluding organi-
zations that engaged in substantial lobbying from § 501(c)(3) status, 
Congress, in its discretion, had chosen not to subsidize lobbying as 
much as it subsidized other activities of nonprofits.137 Central to this 
128 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J. concurring); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 518 (1958). 
129 See 461 U.S. 540, 540 (1983). 
130 [d. at 542. 
131 [d. at 546. 
132 [d. at 541-42. 
133 [d. at 542. 
134 Regan, 540 U.s. at 545. The Court's mention of unconstitutional conditions sweeps the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions into the opinion. See id. The doctrine asserts that even 
though the government has discretion in awarding federal funds, it cannot then force the 
recipient of these funds to waive a constitutional right. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5, 7 (1988). While 
the doctrine and the significant treatment that it receives from commentators is helpful in 
analyzing conditional federal grants, it is also elusive: "Like the police power, it is a creature of 
judicial implication. It roams about constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, 
but not in others." [d. at 10-11. 
186 Regan, 540 U.S. at 545. TWR's lobbying activities placed the organization in the § 501(c)(4) 
tax-exempt category, thereby disallowing tax deductions for charitable contributions made by 
donors. See id. 
136 [d. at 546. 
187 [d. at 544. Section 501(c)(3) organizations have a double subsidy from the government 
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holding was that denying § 501(c)(3) status to TWR did not preclude 
it from lobbying entirely.138 Although TWR could not obtain 
§ 501(c)(3) status, it could qualify as a § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organiza-
tion which would allow it to lobby without restriction.139 The Court 
specifically noted the option of a dual structure.l40 Under this struc-
ture, TWR would not be precluded from lobbying by its ability to 
operate a § 501(c)(3) organization for non-lobbying activities and a 
§ 501(c)(4) organization to engage in lobbying.14l 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun reiterated the impor-
tance of the dual system for First Amendment purposes: "Any sig-
nificant restriction on [the dual structure] would negate the saving 
effect of § 501(c)(4) .... Should the IRS attempt to limit the control 
these organizations exercise over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) 
affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be insurmount-
able .... "142 Justice Blackmun voiced his additional concerns that 
through subsequent legislation § 501(c)(4) organizations would be 
precluded from lobbying on behalf of their § 501(c)(3) affiliates.l43 Voic-
ing his opposition to any such legislation, Justice Blackmun stated 
that this would effectively: 
[P]erpetuate § 501(c)(3) organizations' inability to make known 
their views on legislation without incurring the unconstitutional 
penalty. Such restrictions would extend far beyond Congress's 
mere refusal to subsidize lobbying. In my view, any such restric-
tion would render the statutory scheme unconstitutional. l44 
through receipt of tax-exempt status and the charitable donation deduction. I.R.C. §§ 170(a), 
501(c)(3) (1995). Section 501(c)(4) organizations are not subsidized as heavily since donors do not 
receive charitable donation deductions. Regan, 540 U.S. at 543. The Court in Regan stated that 
it rejected the "'notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they 
are subsidized by the State.''' [d. at 546 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 
515 (1959». 
138 Regan, 540 U.S. at 544. 
139 [d. Note, however, that donors to TWR would not be able to deduct contributions. [d. at 
543. This is addressed by the Court when it states that "Congress chose not to subsidize 
lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations 
undertake to promote the public welfare." [d. at 544. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. at 553-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 
468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (stating that Regan holding-that conditioning § 501(c)(3) status on the 
extent of lobbying activities was not unconstitutional-relied on the ability of § 501(c)(3)'s to 
organize a § 501(c)(4) lobbying arm). 
143 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 553-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
144 [d. 
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The Court in Regan specifically noted that the case did not fall 
within the Speiser-Perry model because the tax code did not deny 
TWR the right to receive deductible contributions because of the 
exercise of free speech through its lobbying activities.145 The Court 
found instead that the case fit squarely within the subsidy model by 
which Congress had simply chosen to exercise discretion in its subsi-
dies to groups such as TWR.146 The Court found, however, that if the 
statutory scheme placed a condition on the receipt of tax-exempt 
status that denied TWR a benefit independent of its tax-exempt 
status and as a result of its lobbying activity, it would be unconstitu-
tiona1.147 In this case, Congress would be imposing a condition that 
was not related to the benefit being bestowed and was therefore 
outside of the scope of Congress's discretion.148 
The Court extended the "subsidy" line of cases in Rust v. Sulli-
van.149 The petitioners in Rust claimed that regulations promulgated 
under § 1008 of the Public Health Service Act150 were unconstitutional 
because they required the recipient of federal funds under Title Xl5l 
for family-planning services to relinquish a constitutional right.152 Pe-
titioners claimed that the regulations violated their First Amendment 
rights to "engage in abortion advocacy and counseling."153 The Court 
disagreed, however, holding that the Government was not denying a 
subsidy or benefit because of the exercise of a constitutional right,154 
but was only requiring that the federal funds be used for what they 
were designated: "'to support preventive family planning services, 
145 See id. at 545-46. 
146 [d. at 546. 
147 See id. at 545. 
148 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. 
149 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991). 
160 [d. at 179-81. The regulations attached three conditions to the receipt of federal money 
under § 1008 of the Public Health Service Act. [d. at 179. First, recipients cannot provide 
counseling that includes advocating abortion as a method of family planning and cannot refer 
clients for outside counseling related to this method. [d. at 179-80. Secondly, recipients cannot 
engage in activities independent of counseling that encourage the use of abortion for family 
planning. [d. at 180. Specifically forbidden are lobbying for legislation increasing the availability 
of abortions and using legal action to make abortions more available as a method of family 
planning. [d. Lastly, the regulations require that recipients of federal funds be organized such 
that they are ''physically and financially separate" from any abortion-related services. [d. at 
180-81. 
151 [d. at 178. Title X provides federal funding for "family-planning services." [d. 
152 [d. at 181. 
153 [d. at 196. 
154 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
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population research, infertility services, and other related medical, 
informational, and educational activities."'155 Important to the Court's 
finding was that the regulations only governed the scope of the activi-
ties for which the federal funds were granted.156 The Court found: 
The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's activities, 
and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities. The Title 
X grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-re-
lated services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is re-
quired to conduct those activities through programs that are 
separate and independent from the project that receives Title X 
funds. 157 
The Court contrasted its holding that the government can place 
conditions on activities for which federal funds were designated with 
the line of "unconstitutional conditions" cases.l58 The Court distin-
guished its holding in Rust by pointing out that in the unconstitutional 
conditions cases, "the Government has placed a condition on the re-
cipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, 
thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the pro-
tected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program."159 
The Court found that the Title X regulations fell outside of the fact 
patterns in the unconstitutional conditions cases, because the regula-
tions govern only the particular program for which the federal funds 
were designated and not the conduct outside of this activity.l60 
In the "subsidy" line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that 
some restrictions imposed by the government as a condition of the 
receipt of benefits will be allowed.161 The Court has held, however, that 
conditions placed on the receipt of benefits which preclude the recipi-
ent from engaging in constitutionally protected activity beyond the 
scope of the activity for which the funds are designated are unconsti-
tutional.162 
150 [d. at 178 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1667, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1970». 
156 [d. at 196. 
157 [d. 
158 [d. at 197. 
159 Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). 
160 [d. at 196--97. 
161 [d.; Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983); Cammarano 
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959). 
162 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
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4. The Distinction Between the Use of Private and Public Funds 
A common thread running through the coercive spending condi-
tions cases is the notation by the Supreme Court of whether the 
organization is able, after receipt of conditional funds, to use its pri-
vate funds to engage in the prohibited or restricted activities.163 In 
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the Court was trou-
bled that a statute not only barred organizations receiving federal 
funds from engaging in editorializing with these funds, but it barred 
this activity even with private funds. 164 The inability of broadcast 
stations to segregate their activities according to federal and private 
funding rendered the statute unconstitutional.165 Without segregation, 
stations would be precluded from making their views known at all, a 
violation of their First Amendment rights.166 
The Court noted, however, that if the statute allowed organizations 
to create privately funded affiliates and allowed them to editorialize, 
this would be constitutional.167 The Court's reasoning followed that of 
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington.168 In Regan, 
the Court noted that the use of a dual structure would allow the 
petitioner to segregate its lobbying activity into a tax code category 
that would allow it unlimited lobbying activity.169 Similarly, the Court 
in League of Women Voters noted that if the statute allowed the use 
of a dual structure, the Court would most likely find it constitutional 
under the Regan Court's reasoning.170 The Court found that: "public 
broadcasting stations would be free ... to make known [their] views 
on matters of public importance through [their] nonfederally funded, 
editorializing affiliate[s] without losing federal grants for [their] 
noneditorializing broadcast activities."171 
Both the majority opinion and Justice Blackmun's concurrence in 
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington noted the 
dichotomy between the use of private and public funds.172 The major-
163 E.g., id. at 197-98; FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). 
164 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400. 
165 [d. at 400--01. To illustrate the effect of the regulations on the private funds of organiza-
tions, the Court used the following example. A noncommercial educational station that received 
only 1% of its budget from federal grants would be barred from editorializing because of its 
inability to segregate federal funds from private funds in operating the station. [d. at 400. 
166 [d. 
167 [d. 
168 [d.; see Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
169 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
170 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400--01. 
171 [d. at 400. 
172 See Regan, 461 U.S. at 545, 553. 
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ity framed the issue in the case not as whether TWR must be permit-
ted to lobby with private funds even though it also receives a govern-
ment subsidy, but rather whether it must be allowed to use tax 
deductible contributions to subsidize its lobbying activity.173 By fram-
ing the issue this way, the Court implicitly recognized that if TWR 
were precluded through the tax code from using its private funds to 
lobby, the outcome of the case may very well have been different.174 
In addition, the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun also noted the 
difference between governmental conditions on the use of private 
funds as opposed to governmental conditions on the use of public 
funds. I75 In his concurrence, Blackmun noted that, although the cur-
rent tax code structure is not unconstitutional because it allows non-
profit organizations to lobby unrestricted by setting up a § 501(c)(4) 
affiliate, any restriction on the ability to do so would render the 
scheme unconstitutional.I76 
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court held that the government could 
condition the receipt of federal funds upon a ban on abortion-related 
activity as long as grantees could engage in abortion-related activities 
in a separate capacity.177 This segregation requirement did not violate 
the grantee's First Amendment right to free speech, but rather en-
sured that federal funds were furthering governmental policies.I78 
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life, the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of § 316 of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act.I79 Section 316 prohibited corpora-
tions from making expenditures "in connection with" federal cam-
paigns from general treasury funds, requiring that any contributions 
made be done through the use of a separate segregated fund. I80 For-
mation of the segregated fund, however, constituted a "political com-
mittee" under the Federal Election Campaign Act and was therefore 
subject to extensive regulation.I81 The Court found that the require-
173 See id. at 543-44. 
174 See id. at 545 (stating that: "The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible 
contributions to support its non-lobbying activities, nor does it deny TWR any independent 
benefit on account of its intention to lobby."). 
175 See id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
176 [d. at 553-54. 
177 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197-98 (1991). 
178 [d. at 198. 
179 See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 238 (1986). 
180 [d. at 241. 
181 See id. at 253--54. The Court noted that the formation of a "political committee" required 
the corporation to appoint a treasurer who was required to maintain extensive records and to 
follow strict and burdensome filing requirements concerning the organization and financial 
status of the corporation. See id. 
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ment of a segregated fund and the accompanying requirements ren-
dered the statute unconstitutional.182 The Court stated: 
[W]hile [the statute] does not remove all opportunities for inde-
pendent spending by organizations ... the avenue it leaves open 
is more burdensome than the one it forecloses. The fact that the 
statute's practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is 
sufficient to characterize [the statute] as an infringement on First 
Amendment activities.183 
The Court specifically distinguished its own opinion in Regan.l84 The 
Court found that: 
Regan . .. involved the requirement that a nonprofit corporation 
establish a separate lobbying entity if contributions to the corpo-
ration for the conduct of other activities were to be tax deductible. 
If the corporation chose not to set up such a lobbying arm, it would 
not be eligible for tax-deductible contributions. Such a result, 
however, would infringe no protected activity, for there is no right 
to have speech subsidized by the Government .... [T]he activity 
that may be discouraged in this case, independent spending, is 
core political speech under the First Amendment.185 
III. THE HISTORY OF THE SIMPSON AND ISTOOK AMENDMENTS 
A. The Simpson Amendment 
On July 21, 1995, members of the United States Congress in favor 
of reforming the lobbying registration and disclosure laws placed the 
Lobbying Reform Act on the Senate calendar.186 Generally, the Act 
added stricter registration and disclosure requirements to already 
existing lobbying laws.187 The Senate aimed to restore public 
182 [d. at 254-55. 
183 [d. at 255. The Court specifically noted that the requirements of the statute would effect 
smaller organizations to a greater extent: 
[S]uch duties require a far more complex and formalized organization than many small 
groups could manage .... Faced with the need to assume a more sophisticated organ-
izational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed re-
ports ... it would not be surprising if at least some of the groups decided that the 
contemplated political activity was simply not worth it. 
[d. at 254--55. 
184 Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 256 n.9. 
185 [d. (citation omitted). 
186 141 CONGo REC. S10,490 (daily ed. July 21, 1995). The Lobbying Reform Act was Senate 
Bill 1060. [d. 
187 See S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4-7 (1995). 
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confidence in government institutions and officials by tightening lob-
bying regulations. ISS 
On July 24, 1995, Amendment No. 1839189 (Simpson Amendment) 
was submitted to the pending Lobbying Reform Act.190 The Simpson 
Amendment provided that: "[a]n organization described in section 
501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1996 which engages in 
lobbying activities shall not be eligible for the receipt of Federal funds 
constituting an award, grant, contract, loan or any other form."191 The 
goal of the Simpson Amendment was to force § 501(c)(4) nonprofit 
organizations either to give up any federal funding they receive or to 
reorganize as a § 501(c)(3) corporation, which by law would severely 
limit their lobbying activities.192 Senator Simpson and his supporters 
targeted § 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporations because of the benefits 
that § 501(c)(4) organizations receive by virtue of their tax code status 
and because of the political nature of the work of § 501(c)(4) organi-
zations.193 
Because there were no lobbying restrictions on the use of private 
funds by § 501(c)(4) organizations prior to the Simpson Amendment, 
188 See id. § 2; 141 CONGo REC. S1O,538-39 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Glenn). 
189 See 141 CONGo REC. S10,539 (daily ed. July 24,1995). Simpson Amendment No. 1839 was 
technically modified by Craig Amendment No. 1842. Id. at S1O,546. The substance of the 
Simpson Amendment, however, remained unchanged by the Craig Amendment. Id. The quoted 
language is in technically corrected form. 
190 Id. The amendment was submitted by Senator Alan K. Simpson, a Republican from 
Wyoming.ld. 
191Id. 
192 See supra Section II.A; 141 CONGo REC. S1O,546 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Craig). Lobbying activities, as defined in the Lobbying Reform Act include: 
[L]obbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and 
planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time 
it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of 
others. 
S. 1060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(7) (1995). The Act further defines "lobbying contacts" as 
including: 
[A]ny oral or written communication (including an electronic communication) to a 
covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official that is made 
on behalf of a client with regard to-(I) the formulation, modification, or adoption of 
federal legislation (including legislative proposals); (II) the formulation, modification, 
or adoption of a federal rule, regulation, executive order, or any other program, policy, 
or position of the United States Government; (III) the administration or execution of 
a federal program or policy (including the negotiation, award, or administration of a 
federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or license); or (IV) the nomination or confirmation 
of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate. 
Id. § 3(8)(A). 
193 See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(4) (1995); Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra 
note 18, at 1663-64 (characterizing § 501(c)(4) organizations as "politically active"). 
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Senator Simpson and his supporters believed that providing federal 
funds to organizations that engage in lobbying amounts to lobbying 
"subsidies" for nonprofits.194 Proponents of the Simpson Amendment 
focused on the fungibility of federal grants.195 For example, suppose 
that a nonprofit received $100,000 in federal funds in fiscal year 1995 
and also received hundreds of thousands in private funds. If, in that 
same year, the nonprofit spent $100,000 on lobbying, how can anyone 
be certain that the $100,000 federal grant was not spent on lobby-
ing?196 Proponents also argued that the fungibility of federal grants 
increased an organization's ability to lobby.197 For example, when a 
nonprofit receives a $100,000 federal grant, it then has a $100,000 
surplus in its treasury due to the influx of federal funds. Prior to 
enactment of the Simpson Amendment, these treasury funds had no 
restrictions on them and could be used for unlimited lobbying.198 Fi-
nally, proponents argued that the fungibility of federal funds creates 
an appearance that the nonprofit is a larger player in the political 
arena than it really is, thereby overestimating its popular support.199 
Those opposing the Simpson Amendment labeled the Amendment 
redundant in light of the existing ban on the use of federal funds to 
lobby.2OO Opponents argued that if the driving force behind the Simp-
son Amendment was concern that § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations 
were using federal funds to lobby, investigation and penalties under 
the federal law prohibiting lobbying would adequately address these 
concerns.201 In addition, opponents expressed concern that the real 
motivation behind the Simpson Amendment was not to reform prac-
tices amongst the 140,000 § 501(c)(4) organizations that accept federal 
194 See 141 CONGo REG. S10,550 (daily ed. July 24,1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl: "No American 
should be taxed to advance the political agenda of an organization that he or she may have no 
wish to support or one that advocates an agenda that he strongly opposes. Subsidies for political 
advocacy are wrong."). 
195 See id. at S10,543 (position paper of the Heritage Foundation). 
196 See id. 
197 [d. at S10,549 (statement of Sen. Kyl: "once a Federal grant reaches the organizations' bank 
account, it simply frees up additional dollars for the groups to spend on lobbying activities. Many 
of the organizations are on Capitol Hill every day, often lobbying for more taxpayer money on 
one program or another. Congress has not only been filling the trough, but paying these groups 
to feed there."). 
198 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (1995); supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
199 141 CONGo REG. S10,543 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (position paper of the Heritage Founda-
tion). 
200 See 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994); 141 CONGo REG. S1O,557 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Levin). 
201 141 CONGo REG. S10,556-57 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
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money. Instead, opponents believed that the driving force behind the 
Amendment was to silence the small number of organizations whose 
policies are in conflict with the policies of the Republican-led Con-
gress.202 Finally, opponents expressed concern that the Simpson 
Amendment infringes on the First Amendment rights of § 501(c)(4) 
nonprofits by preventing the use of private funds to express ideas and 
to petition the government.203 
Opposition to the Simpson Amendment dwindled when opponents 
found a loophole in the application of the Amendment. Nothing in the 
language of the Amendment precludes splitting already existing 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations into two § 501(c)(4) organizations-one oper-
ating solely on privately raised funds and responsible for lobbying 
activity, and one operating on both federal and private funding.204 The 
result of splitting the nonprofit into two organizations would be to 
allow unlimited lobbying activity in the organization that did not 
contain any federal funds.205 
On the same day that Senator Simpson proposed the Simpson 
Amendment, the House passed the Amendment.206 Subsequently, the 
House passed the Lobbying Reform Act, with the Simpson Amend-
ment attached, sending the entire bill to the House of Repre-
sentatives for approval.2°7 After some delay, the House of Repre-
202 [d. at SIO,556 (statement of Senator Dodd: "it seems to me that we are taking ... a rather 
draconian step ... out of the 140,000 we are talking a handful that really stick in the craw of 
my colleague from Wyoming [a Republican Senator]."). Out of the 140,000 § 501(c)(4) corpora-
tions accepting federal funds, a study introduced by proponents of the Amendment focused on 
only fifty-six organizations. See id. at SIO,547. In addition, a position paper by the Heritage 
Foundation read during the Senate debate studied only ten organizations including the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund and the World Wildlife Fund. [d. at SIO,545-46. 
208 See id. at SIO,555 (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
204 [d. (statement of Senator Simpson: "if a 501(c)(4) decided that they wanted to continue to 
lobby and were receiving Federal funds, they could no longer continue to lobby. However, if 
they wished to continue to receive Federal funds, then they would limit their lobbying activities. 
They can also go into splits, if they wish to split a 501(c)(4) organization. At least that would be 
an improvement over present law, which simply says that these groups can lobby.") 
205 See id. 
206 141 CONGo REC. SIO,559 (daily ed. July 24, 1995). The vote on the Simpson Amendment 
was 59 in favor and 37 in opposition. [d. Fifty-two Republicans and seven Democrats voted in 
favor of the Amendment while no Republicans and 37 Democrats voted to reject the Amend-
ment. [d. 
207 Jonathan D. Salant, Senate Passes Tighter Rules on Registration, Disclosure, CONGo Q., 
July 29, 1995, at 2239. The Lobbying Reform Act passed the Senate by a vote of 98 in favor, 
with no members in opposition. [d. The reason for the unanimous passage of the Lobbying 
Reform Act was most likely due to Congress's perception that voting in opposition to a bill that 
set limits for lobbying activities would result in negative public reaction. 
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sentatives passed the Lobbying Reform Act.208 Subsequently, Presi-
dent Clinton signed the Lobbying Reform Act into law.209 
Within days of the Lobbying Reform Act and the Simpson Amend-
ment becoming law, members of the House of Representatives filed 
legislation to repeal the Simpson Amendment from the Lobbying 
Reform Act.210 Currently, the repealing legislation sits in the House 
Judiciary Committee.211 
B. The Istook Amendment 
1. Version I of the Istook Amendment 
The Istook Amendment, in its first version,212 proposed to restrict 
"political advocacy"213 by all organizations that receive federal 
funds.214 Like the Simpson Amendment, restrictions in the Istook 
Amendment affect § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations.215 Unlike the 
Simpson Amendment, however, the Istook Amendment also affects 
§ 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, already heavily restricted by the 
Internal Revenue Code.216 Because of its sweeping nature, the Istook 
Amendment garnered much more attention than the Simpson 
Amendment, both on the House floor and in the media.217 
208 141 CONGo REC. HI3,744-45 (daily ed. Nov. 29,1995); Jonathan D. Salant, Bill Would Open 
Windows on Lobbying Efforts, CONGo Q., Dec. 2, 1995, at 3631. The House of Representatives 
passed the Senate's version of the Lobbying Reform Act in lieu of H.R. 2564, the Lobbying 
Reform Act initially offered for approval to the House. Salant, supra. 
209 Lobbying Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 18, 109 Stat. 689, 689 (1995). 
210 141 CONGo REC. H14,963 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1995). Representative Skaggs, a Democrat from 
Colorado, filed H.R. 2785 on December 15, 1995. [d. 
211 [d. 
212 H.R. 2127, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601--B06 (1995); Jonathan D. Salant & Robert Marshall 
Wells, AARPs Federal Funds Endangered, CONGo Q., July 29, 1995, at 2240. The first version 
of the Istook Amendment appeared as Title VI of the Labor and Health and Human Services 
appropriations bill in the House of Representatives. Salant & Wells, supra. 
213 See H.R. 2127, § 601(c)(I). The Istook Amendment restricts "political advocacy," a broad 
interpretation of lobbying activities. [d. Exactly what activities are classified as "political 
advocacy" will be discussed later in this Comment. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying 
text. 
214 H.R. 2127, § 601(a). 
215 See id. 
216 See id.; supra notes 55--Bl and accompanying text for a discussion of restrictions on 
§ 50l(c)(3) organizations. The Istook Amendment affects all federal grant recipients, regardless 
of their tax code status. See H.R. 2127, § 601(a). This Comment, however, concentrates on the 
effects of the Amendment on the two most common tax-exempt categories, § 501(c)(3) and 
§ 50l(c)(4) organizations. 
217 See, e.g., Muzzling the Nonprojits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at A26; Elliot Richardson & 
Tom Joe, Reject that Gag Rule, WASH. POST, Aug. 29,1995, at A19; A Lobbying Rule We Don't 
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As attached to the Labor-Health and Human Services Appropria-
tions Bill, the Istook Amendment cut off federal funds to all nonprofit 
organizations, including § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations that 
engaged in lobbying over the "political advocacy threshold."218 As 
defined in the bill, the "political advocacy threshold" would have cut 
off federal funds to any grant recipient that either spent more than: 
(1) five percent of the first $20 million of its budget over the previous 
five fiscal years on political advocacy; or (2) one percent of its budget 
over $20 million for political advocacy in the current fiscal year.219 
"Political advocacy" encompasses a much broader range of activi-
ties than "lobbying activities," the pivotal term in the Simpson 
Amendment.22o As defined in the Istook Amendment, "political advo-
cacy" included all activities designed to influence legislation and po-
litical campaigns.221 In addition, the definition extended to litigation, 
including amicus work, and agency proceedings where federal, state, 
Need, supra note 28, at 4Q. At different points during the first session of the 104th Congress 
the Istook Amendment was the subject of many articles and editorials in most of the major 
newspapers in the United States. See, e.g., Muzzling the Nonprojits, supra; Richardson & Joe, 
supra; A Lobbying Rule We Don't Need, supra note 28, at 4Q. 
218 H.R. 2127, § 601(a)(1)-(3). H.R. 2127 read in relevant part: 
Id. 
[T]he following limitations apply to any grant which is made from funds appropriated 
... (1) No grantee may use funds from any grant to engage in political advocacy. (2) 
No grant applicant may receive any grant if its expenditures for political advocacy for 
anyone of the previous five Federal fiscal years exceeded its prohibited political 
advocacy threshold ... (3) During anyone Federal fiscal year in which a grantee has 
possession, custody or control of grant funds, the grantee shall not use any funds ... 
to engage in political advocacy in excess of its prohibited political advocacy threshold 
for the prior Federal fiscal year. 
219Id. § 601(a)(2). The formula for determining the "political advocacy threshold" of an organi-
zation is determined by calculating the difference between the grant applicant's total expendi-
tures made in a given Federal fiscal year and the total grants it received in that Federal fiscal 
year, multiplying the first $20,000,000 of the difference by .05 and multiplying the remainder of 
the difference calculated by .01. The sum of these two figures is the "political advocacy thresh-
old." See id. § 601(a)(2)(A)-CD). In addition to meeting the requirements of the "political advo-
cacy threshold," recipients of federal funds would also be required to comply with either the 
"no substantial part" test of § 501(c)(3) or the § 501(h) election. See supra notes 55--61 and 
accompanying text. 
220 See supra note 192. 
221 H.R. 2127, § 601(c)(1)(AHB). H.R. 2127 defined "political advocacy" to include: 
Id. 
(A) carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation or agency 
action, including, but not limited to monetary or in-kind contributions, endorsements, 
publicity, or similar activity; (B) participating or intervening in (including the publish-
ing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition 
to) any candidate for public office, including but not limited to monetary or in-kind 
contributions, endorsements, publicity, or similar activity .... 
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or local governments were parties.222 Finally, "political advocacy" in-
cluded giving money or in-kind support to any organization whose 
own expenditures for political advocacy exceeded fifteen percent of 
its total expenditures for that federal fiscal year.223 This definition 
precludes a broader range of activities than those precluded by the 
Internal Revenue Code.224 
The Istook Amendment also placed restrictions on the types of 
organizations with which nonprofit federal grant recipients could do 
business.225 Under the Amendment, recipients of federal money would 
not be able to conduct business with any other organization or person 
that had spent more than fifteen percent of its budget in the previous 
fiscal year on political advocacy.226 This provision would prevent or-
222 Id. § 601(c)(1)(C). The definition of "political advocacy" also included: 
Id. 
[P]articipating in any judicial litigation or agency proceeding (including as an amicus 
curiae) in which agents or instrumentalities of Federal, State, or local governments 
are parties, other than litigation in which the grantee or grant applicant: is a defendant 
appearing in its own behalf; is defending its tax-exempt status; or is challenging a 
government decision or action directed specifically at the powers, rights, or duties of 
that grantee or grant applicant .... 
223 Id. § 601(c)(1)(D). 
224 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. The definition of political advocacy spe-
cifically excluded the following activities: 
(i) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, research, or debate; (ii) 
providing technical advice or assistance (where such advice would otherwise constitute 
the influencing of legislation or agency action) to a governmental body or to a commit-
tee or other subdivision thereof in response to a request by such body or subdivision, 
as the case may be; (iii) communications between the grantee and its bona fide mem-
bers with respect to legislation, proposed legislation, agency action, or proposed agency 
action of direct interest to the grantee and such members, other than communications 
described in subparagraph (C); (iv) any communication with a governmental official or 
employee, other than-(I) a communication with a member or employee of a legislative 
body or agency (where such communication would otherwise constitute the influencing 
of legislation or agency action); or (II) a communication the principal purpose of which 
is to influence legislation or agency action and; (v) official communications by employees 
of State or local governments, or by organizations whose membership consists exclu-
sively of State or local governments; (C) Communications with Members---(i) A com-
munication between a grantee and any bona fide member of such organization to 
directly encourage such member to communicate as provided in paragraph (2)(A)(ii) 
shall be treated as a paragraph (2)(A)(ii) communication by the grantee itself. (ii) A 
communication between a grantee and any bona fide member of such organization to 
directly encourage such member to urge persons other than members to communicate 
as provided in either clause (i) or (ii) paragraph (2)(A) shall be treated as a communi-
cation described in paragraph (2)(A)(i). 
H.R. 2127, § 601(c)(1)(D). 
225 H.R. 2127,§ 601(a)(4). 
226 Id. The Istook Amendment stated: 
No grantee may use funds from any grant to purchase or secure any goods or services 
(including dues and membership fees) from any other individual, entity, or organization 
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ganizations that utilize a dual structure from doing business with the 
lobbying arm of the organization.227 
The Istook Amendment also contained strict provisions to enforce 
the requirements laid out in the Amendment.228 Under the Amend-
ment, every grantee of federal funds would have been subject to 
random auditing and would have had the burden of proving to the 
government by clear and convincing evidence the grantee's compli-
ance with the Act.229 In addition, there were strict disclosure require-
ments for recipients.23o Each year, every grantee would have had to 
file an annual report stating either that it did not engage in political 
advocacy or setting forth a detailed description of the political advo-
cacy in which it was engaged.231 
Finally, the Istook Amendment created a statutory cause of action 
against any federal grant recipient found to be in violation of the 
Amendment.232 This requirement would subject recipients of federal 
funds to lawsuits by both the government and by zealous individuals 
who would be entitled to bring civil actions against the recipient.233 In 
Id. 
whose expenditures for political advocacy for the previous Federal fiscal year exceeded 
15 percent of its total expenditures for that Federal fiscal year. 
227 See id.; supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing use of dual system). 
228 H.R. 2127, § 601(b)(1). 
229Id. § 601(b)(1). The Istook Amendment provided that: 
Id. 
(1) Each grantee shall be subject to audit from time to time as follows: (A) Audits may 
be requested and conducted by the General Accounting Office or other auditing entity 
authorized by Congress, including the inspector general of the Federal entity awarding 
or administering the grant ... (C) A grantee that engages in political advocacy shall 
have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in compliance 
with the limitations of this section. 
23°Id. § 602(a). 
231 Id. The required information would have been: 
(A) the grant identification number; (B) the amount or value of the grant (including all 
administrative and overhead costs awarded); (C) a brief description of the purpose or 
purposes for which the grant was awarded; (D) the identity of each Federal, state and 
local government entity awarding or administering the grant, and program thereun-
der; (E) the name and grantee identification number of each individual, entity, or 
organization to whom the grantee made a grant; (F) a brief description of the grantee's 
political advocacy, and a good faith estimate of the grantee's expenditures on political 
advocacy; (G) a good faith estimate of the grantee's prohibited political advocacy 
threshold. 
Id. § 602(a)(2)(AHG). 
232Id. § 601(b)(2). The Istook Amendment allowed for the federal grant at issue to be "recov-
ered in the same manner and to the same extent as a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval made to the Federal Government pursuant to sections 3729 through 3812 of title 31, 
United States Code." Id.; 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3812 (1994). 
233 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). Allowing individuals to sue federal grant recipients for non-com-
pliance with the Istook Amendment would most likely create a "bounty-like" atmosphere 
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addition, employees of the federal government who knowingly or 
negligently granted funds to organizations not in compliance with the 
Amendment would have been subject to disciplinary action and civil 
penalties.234 
The same day that the House of Representative was to vote on the 
Labor-Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill with the Is-
took Amendment attached, an amendment to strip the Istook Amend-
ment from the Bill was introduced.2.% Debate in the House on this 
Amendment, the Skaggs Amendment, was heated.236 Like opponents 
of the Simpson Amendment, opponents of the Istook Amendment 
attacked the Amendment as an unconstitutional violation of the First 
Amendment rights of all organizations receiving federal funds.237 
Again, opponents questioned the larger political motivations of the 
Republicans who had initiated the Istook Amendment.238 
Opponents raised additional arguments not raised during the de-
bate on the Simpson Amendment. First, opponents repeatedly ques-
tioned the selectiveness of the Istook Amendment.239 Opponents ques-
tioned why the Istook Amendment targeted nonprofit organizations 
whereby groups opposing the political viewpoints of grant recipients would harass the recipients 
through litigation. Aron, supra note 68, at 19. 
234 H.R. 2127, § 601(b)(3). The Istook Amendment stated: 
Id. 
Any officer or employee of the Federal Government who awards or administers funds 
from any grant to a grantee who is not in compliance with this section shall-(A) for 
knowing or negligent noncompliance with this section, be sUbjected to appropriate 
administrative discipline, including, when circumstances warrant, suspension from 
duty without payor removal from office; and (B) for knowing noncompliance with this 
section, pay a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each improper disbursement of 
funds. 
235 141 CONGo REC. H8388 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995). Representative Skaggs introduced House 
Amendment No. 64 on August 3,1995. Id. 
236 See generally id. at H8388-97. 
237 Id. at H8390. Representative Collins of Illinois read a statement from David Cole, a 
constitutional law professor at Georgetown University Law Center: 
Id. 
The Istook bill is constitutionally flawed in numerous respects, most fundamentally 
because it restricts the rights of all federal grantees to use their own money to engage 
in core First Amendment protected activities, including public debate on issues of 
public concern, communication with elected representatives, and litigation against the 
government. 
238 Id. at H8392 (statement of Rep. Sabo: "This legislation tells American workers and stu-
dents, the children and the elderly, the middle class and the disadvantaged to absorb painful 
budget cuts so that the very wealthiest can prosper further still. This objective is at the core 
of the Republicans' fiscal agenda."). Id. 
239Id. at H8939. 
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but the Appropriations Committee rejected a proposed revision that 
would have imposed the Amendment's prohibitions on contractors240 
receiving federal contracts and loans.241 Opponents also questioned 
why the Amendment targeted organizations with small budgets.242 
Notwithstanding these valid concerns, the House rejected the 
Amendment that would have stripped the Istook language from the 
Lab or-Health and Human Services Appropriations Bill.243 Sub-
sequently, the House passed the Labor-Health and Human Services 
Appropriations Bill with the Istook Amendment intact.244 
In the Senate, opposition to the Istook Amendment was fierce.245 
By the time the Labor-Health and Human Services Appropriations 
Bill was reported to the Senate, the Istook language had been 
stripped off by the Senate Labor-Health and Human Services Sub-
committee.246 
2. Version II of the Istook Amendment 
Version II of the Istook Amendment had substantial differences 
from Version 1.247 First, Version II of the Istook Amendment capped 
240 See I.R.C. § 162(e) (1995). Corporate taxpayers are prevented from deducting costs asso-
ciated with lobbying. Id. 
241 141 CONGo REC. H8393 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Sabo). Representative 
Sabo said on the House floor: "A very select group of organizations would be impacted by these 
prohibitions. In an unjustifiable break with current laws, the political activities of Federal 
grantees alone are singled out while Federal contractors are left alone." Id.; see also id. at H8395 
(statement of Rep. Obey: "Their amendment does not apply to corporate lobbyists who can do 
full page ads telling us every day to spend $50, $60, $70 billion of taxpayers' money on airplanes 
we do not need while we are trying to starve our own folks. We should be ashamed of ourselves. 
This amendment is an absolute joke and it is a disgrace to the Congress."). 
242Id. at H8393 (statement of Rep. Sabo). For example, an organization with a budget of 
$100,000,000 would be allowed to spend $1 million on political advocacy. Id. But an organization 
with a $100,000 budget would only be allowed to spend $5,000 on political advocacy. Id. 
243Id. at H8396-97. The Amendment was rejected by a vote of 187 in favor and 232 in 
opposition.Id. 
244 Id. at H8419-21. The vote on the Bill was 219 in favor with 208 in opposition. '!\vo hundred 
and fourteen Republicans and five Democrats voted for the Bill, while 18 Republicans and 189 
Democrats voted against it. Id. 
245 Andrew Taylor, Treasury-Postal Conferees Fail to Resolve Lobbying Issue, CONGo Q., Oct. 
28, 1995, at 3299 (reporting that the Istook Amendment was not expected to get past Senator 
Arlen Specter, the Senate Labor and Health and Human Services Subcommittee Chairman). 
246 Robert Marshall Wells, Panel Votes to Soften Cuts in Labor-HHS Spending, CONGo Q., 
Sept. 16, 1995, at 2812. 
247 See supra Section III.B.l. Version II of the Istook Amendment was initially introduced as 
part of H.R. 2020, the Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill. Taylor, supra note 245, at 3299. 
Initially, an Amendment substantially similar to the Simpson Amendment-Amendment 2237-
was successfully attached by Senator Simpson to the Treasury-Postal Bill. 141 CONGo REC. 
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"political advocacy" expenses at $100,000 for organizations with budg-
ets, more than one-third of which was derived from federal grants.24S 
In addition, this version of the Istook Amendment exempted organi-
zations that spent less than $25,000 per year on political advocacy.249 
Supporters of the Amendment claimed this safe harbor exempted 
over ninety-six percent of nonprofit organizations from the effects of 
the Istook Amendment.25o In addition, the formula from the original 
Istook Amendment251 was changed to a sliding scale that allowed 
recipients of federal funds to spend twenty percent of the :first 
$500,000 of their budget on political advocacy, with the permitted 
percentage descending as the amount of an organization's budget 
rose.252 Regardless of the permitted percentages, the revised Istook 
Amendment placed a hard cap of $1 million on the political advocacy 
expenditures by all federal grant recipients.253 Ultimately, Senate con-
ferees rejected Version II of the Istook Amendment in favor of 
Amendment 2237, a version of the Simpson Amendment which had 
been successfully attached to the Treasury-Postal Bill.254 Neverthe-
less, debate on Version II of the Istook Amendment held up passage 
of the Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill for ten weeks.255 The abil-
ity of proponents of the Istook Amendment to frustrate the budget 
processes of the United States reflects the firm commitment of these 
proponents to pass the Istook Amendment. 
3. Version III of the Istook Amendment 
Proponents of the Istook Amendment again succeeded in attaching 
the Amendment to the stopgap budget bill, House Joint Resolution 
115.256 The language in Version III of the Istook Amendment was 
Sl1,630--31 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1995). Specifically, Amendment 2237 would have cut off federal 
grants to § 501(c)(4) organizations with budgets of $10,000,000 or more and which engaged in 
lobbying activities. See id.; Taylor, supra note 245, at 3299. Proponents of the Istook Amendment 
seized the opportunity to substitute Version II of the Istook Amendment for Amendment 2237 
in committee. Taylor, supra note 245, at 3299. 
248 Taylor, supra note 245, at 3299. 
249 [d. 
250 [d. 
251 Supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
252 Taylor, supra note 245, at 3299. 
253 [d. 
254 [d. In conference, the $10,000,000 budget limit in the Simpson Amendment was lowered to 
$3,000,000. [d. 
255 Tamar Lewin, Liberal Urging Has Given Way to Eerie Hush, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1995, 
at AI. 
256 H.R.J. Res. 115, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Taylor, supra note 19, at 3443. Once attached, 
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similar to Version II.257 All organizations were ineligible for federal 
funds if in the previous federal fiscal year the organization received 
more than one-third of its revenues from federal grants and expended 
more than a certain amount on "lobbying activities,"258 the lesser of 
either $100,000 or a calculation based on the difference between total 
expenditures made by the organization and grants received by the 
organization.259 All § 501(c)(4) organizations, except for those with 
opponents attempted to bounce the Istook Amendment off of the budget bill before a full vote 
on the budget was held. Taylor, supra note 19, at 3443. Proponents of the Istook Amendment 
succeeded, however, in passing a rule making provision that precluded any amendments to the 
budget bill, thereby assuring that the Istook Amendment would remain on the budget bill until 
the vote. ld. The provision was introduced via House Resolution 257. H.R. Res. 257, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1995). The resolution read: 
That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution the House shall without inter-
vention of any point of order consider in the House the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 115) 
making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1996, and for other pur-
poses. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution and 
any amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except (1) one 
hour of debate on the joint resolution, which shall be equally divided and controlled by 
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations; and 
(2) one motion to recommit, which may include instructions only if offered by the 
minority leader or his designee. 
ld. The vote on the resolution was 216 in favor and 210 in opposition. 141 CONGo REC. H11,890-91 
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 1995). House Joint Resolution 115, with the Istook Amendment intact, sub-
sequently passed the House of Representatives on November 8, 1995. ld. at H11,904-05. 
257 See H.R.J. Res. 115; supra Section III.B.2. 
258 H.R.J. Res. 115, § 301 (a)(6). Lobbying activities were defined as anything included in the 
definition of political advocacy with the exception of activities "relating to any judicial litigation 
or agency proceeding .... " ld. § 301(d)(6). The Resolution defined political advocacy in terms 
substantially similar to Version I of the Istook Amendment. See id.; supra notes 220-23 and 
accompanying text. The exceptions to the definition of political advocacy were also substantially 
similar to Version I of the Istook Amendment. See H.R.J. Res. 115; supra note 224 and 
accompanying text. Version III of the Istook Amendment added the following exception: 
[P]articipating in a particular activity that is specifically and explicitly directed and 
sanctioned by an Act of Congress, and is specifically and explicitly approved in the 
contract or other agreement under which the taxpayer subsidized grant is made, 
except that such exception shall not apply to any such contract or other agreement 
that is first entered into after the date of the enactment of this Act, is renewed after 
such date, or is terminable or amendable after such date at the option of the govern-
ment entity awarding or administering such grant, unless such activity is specifically 
and explicitly directed and sanctioned by an Act of Congress after January 1, 1995. 
H.R.J. Res. 115, § 301(d)(4)(B)(vi). 
259 H.R.J. Res. 115, § 301(a)(7)(B). The formula for the calculation was as follows: 
(i) Calculate the difference between the taxpayer subsidized grant applicant's total 
expenditures made in a given Federal fiscal year and the total taxpayer subsidized 
grants it received in that Federal fiscal year. (ii) For the first $500,000 of the amount 
calculated under clause (i), multiply by 0.20. (iii) For the portion of the amount calcu-
lated under clause (i) that is more than $500,000 but not more than $1,000,000, multiply 
by 0.15. (iv) For the portion of the amount calculated under clause (i) that is more than 
$1,000,000, but not more than $1,500,000, multiply by 0.10. (v) For the portion of the 
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gross annual revenues ofless than $3,000,000, would have been barred 
from receiving federal funds if they also engaged in lobbying activi-
ties.260 In addition, the Amendment barred all federal grant recipients, 
other than § 501(c)(4) organizations,261 from receiving federal funds if 
their expenditures for political advocacy exceeded the lesser of 
$1,000,000 or a calculation, again based on the difference between the 
organization's total expenditures and total grants received.262 It fur-
ther barred organizations that received federal funds from purchasing 
or securing goods or services from other organizations with political 
advocacy expenditures in the previous federal fiscal year of either: (1) 
$25,000 or (2) fifteen percent of the organization's total expenditures 
for the previous federal fiscal year.263 Federal grant recipients who 
spent less than $25,000 on political advocacy in the previous Federal 
fiscal year were exempt from the requirements of this version of the 
Istook Amendment.264 Again, proponents claimed that this exempted 
ninety-six percent of federal grant recipients.265 This version of the 
Istook Amendment subsequently passed the House.266 
[d. 
amount calculated under clause (i) that is more than $1,500,000, but not more than 
$17,000,000, multiply by 0.05. (vi) calculate the sum of the products described in clauses 
(ii) through (v). 
260 [d. § 301(a)(5). This portion of Version III of the Istook Amendment used the term "lob-
bying activities" rather than the term political advocacy, used throughout the rest of the Bill. 
[d. As defined in the Resolution, "lobbying activities" included all activities encompassed within 
the definition of "political advocacy" other than "advocacy relating to any judicial litigation or 
agency proceeding .... " [d. § 301(d)(6). 
261 [d. § 301(a)(5). 
262 [d. § 301(a)(7). The calculation in the Resolution was the same used to calculate political 
advocacy and lobbying expenditures in the Resolution. [d. § 301(a)(7)(B). 
263 [d. § 301(a)(9). 
264 H.R.J. Res. 115, § 301(a)(10). Version II of the Istook Amendment contained the same 
provision. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. 
265 141 CONGo REC. H11,885 (daily ed. Nov. 8,1995) (statement of Rep. Istook). Representative 
Istook claimed on the House floor: 
[d. 
[W]e have an exemption in this bill that exempts 96 percent of the charities in this 
country from any limitation. That is the provision which states that only if they expend 
more than $25,000 in political advocacy do they come within any of these percentage 
limitations whatsoever. Ninety-six percent of the 501(c)(3)'s in the United States, 
according to their submissions to the IRS, do not spend that much. It is a much smaller 
number that has been abusive, and we are trying to target that abuse. 
266 [d. at H11,904--{)5. The Senate substituted a diluted Amendment in place of the Istook 
Amendment that the House had passed. 141 CONGo REC. S16,925-26 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1995). 
Senator Alan K. Simpson substituted Amendment No. 3048 for the Istook Amendment. [d. The 
substitute Amendment barred all § 501(c)(4) organizations with budgets of more than $3,000,000 
from receiving federal funds if they engaged in "lobbying activities." [d. "Lobbying activities," 
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as defined in this version included all "lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, 
including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is 
intended, at the time it is performed, for the use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying 
activities of others." 141 CONGo REC. H11,904-05 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1995). Lobbying contacts 
specifically included: 
[A]ny oral or written communications (including an electronic communication) to a 
covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official that is made 
on behalf of a client with regard to-(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of 
Federal legislation (including legislative proposals); (ii) the formulation, modification, 
or adoption of a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, 
or position of the United States Government; (iii) the administration or execution of a 
Federal program or policy (including the negotiation, award, or administration of a 
Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or license); or (iv) the nomination or confirmation 
of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate. 
[d. The definition of lobbying contacts did not include communications which were: 
(i) made by a public official acting in the public official's capacity; (ii) made by the 
representative of a media organization if the purpose of the communication is gathering 
and disseminating news and information to the public; (iii) made in a speech, article, 
publication or other material that is distributed and made available to the public, or 
through radio, television, cable television, or other medium of mass communication; (iv) 
made on behalf of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party and 
disclosed under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.); 
(v) a request for a meeting, a request for the status of an action, or any other similar 
administrative request, if the request does not include an attempt to influence a 
covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official; (vi) made in 
the course of participation in an advisory committee subject to the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act; (vii) testimony given before a committee, subcommittee, or task force 
of the Congress, or submitted for inclusion in the public record of a hearing conducted 
by such committee, subcommittee, or task force; (viii) information provided in writing 
in response to an oral or written request by a covered executive branch official or a 
covered legislative branch official for specific information; (ix) required by subpoena, 
civil investigative demand, or otherwise compelled by statute, regulation, or other 
action of the Congress or an agency; (x) made in response to a notice in the Federal 
Register, Commerce Business Daily, or other similar publication soliciting communica-
tions from the public and directed to the agency official specifically designated in the 
notice to receive such communications; (xi) not possible to report without disclosing 
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which is prohibited by law; (xii) made to 
an official in an agency with regard to-(I) a judicial proceeding or a criminal or civil 
law enforcement inquiry, investigation, or proceeding; or (II) a filing or proceeding that 
the Government is specifically required by statute or regulation to maintain or conduct 
on a confidential basis, if that agency is charged with responsibility for such proceeding, 
inquiry, investigation, or filing; (xiii) made in compliance with written agency proce-
dures regarding an adjudication conducted by the agency under section 554 of title 5, 
United States Code, or substantially similar provisions; (xiv) a written comment filed 
in the course of a public proceeding or any other communication that is made on the 
record in a public proceeding; (xv) a petition for agency action made in writing and 
required to be a matter of public record pursuant to established agency procedures; 
(xvi) made on behalf of an individual with regard to that individual's benefits, employ-
ment, or other personal matters involving only that individual, except that this clause 
does not apply to any communication with-(I) a covered executive branch official, or 
(II) a covered legislative branch official (other than the individual's elected Members 
of Congress or employees who work under such Members' direct supervision), with 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Simpson Amendment and the Proposed Istook 
Amendment: Unconstitutional under the Speiser-Perry Model 
Because lobbying is a constitutionally protected First Amendment 
activity,267 both the Simpson Amendment and the proposed Istook 
Amendment condition268 federal funding on the relinquishment of a 
respect to the formulation, modification, or adoption of private legislation for the relief 
of that individual .... 
Id. In addition, all federal grant recipients receiving more than $125,000 in federal funds were 
subject to the limits in I.R.C. § 491l(c)(2)(B) on their lobbying activity expenditures. Id. The 
reference to the limitations in § 491l(c)(2)(B) was a technical error. There is no such code 
provision. What the Amendment most likely meant to refer to were the limitations in § 491l(a) 
which impose a tax equal to twenty-five percent of the amount of any "lobbying expenditures" 
in excess of the "lobbying nontaxable amount." See I.R.C. § 491l(a)(I) (1995). Lobbying expen-
ditures are defined as any expenditures for the purpose of influencing legislation. See id. 
§ 491l(c)(I). The code further defines activities that influence legislation as: 
(A) any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions 
of the general public or any segment thereof, and (B) any attempt to influence any 
legislation through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, 
or with any government official or employee who may participate in the formulation 
of the legislation. 
Id. § 491l(d)(I). The definition of "influencing legislation" does not include: 
(A) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research; (B) pro-
viding of technical advice or assistance (where such advice would otherwise constitute 
the influencing of legislation) to a governmental body or to a committee or other 
subdivision thereof in response to a written request by such body or subdivision, as 
the case may be; (C) appearances before, or communications to, any legislative body 
with respect to a possible decision of such body which might affect the existence of the 
organization, its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contribu-
tions to the organization; (D) communications between the organization and its bona 
fide members with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to 
the organization and such members, other than communications described in para-
graph (3); and (E) any communication with a governmental official or employee, other 
than--{i) a communication with a member or employee of a legislative body (where 
such communication would otherwise constitute the influencing of legislation), or (ii) a 
communication the principal purpose of which is to influence legislation. 
Id. § 491l(d)(2). Those receiving less than $125,000 were exempt from the requirements of the 
substitute Amendment. 141 CONGo REC. SI6,925-26 (daily ed. Nov. 9,1995). In addition, organi-
zations with budgets of $17,000,000 or more were allowed to spend an additional one percent of 
their funds on lobbying activities. Id. The Senate passed this substitute Amendment. This 
version of the Istook Amendment was passed on November 9, 1995 by a vote of 49 in favor and 
47 in opposition. Id. at SI6,891. President Clinton subsequently vetoed the measure. Since the 
attempt to enact the Istook Amendment through the stopgap spending bill, supporters of the 
Istook Amendment have been unable to find an appropriate legislative vehicle. 
267 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 
(1961). 
268 The condition that recipients of federal funds not engage in lobbying activities as a condi-
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constitutional right.269 As such, analysis of the constitutionality of 
these Amendments270 falls under the Speiser-Perry model which 
stands for the proposition that the government cannot condition the 
receipt of federal benefits upon the relinquishment of constitutionally 
protected activities.271 
Like the oath of loyalty that the State of California attempted to 
have veterans sign in exchange for a property tax-exemption in 
Speiser,272 both the Simpson and Istook Amendments require non-
profits to end all lobbying efforts273 or lose their federal moneys.274 
Moreover, like the teacher in Perry, whose benefit of a teaching 
position was possibly revoked for speaking out against his college's 
administration, under the Simpson and Istook Amendments, 
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) nonprofit organizations that continue to 
lobby will lose their federal moneys for participating in constitution-
ally protected activities.275 The concern of the Court in both Perry and 
tion of receiving federal funds is a coercive condition. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 1114; supra 
notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The condition is not merely classifying because it does not 
only function to define the categories of federal grant recipients. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, 
at 1114; supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. It is coercive because it functions to influence 
the decision by the organization whether to engage in lobbying. See Rosenthal, supra note 3, at 
1114; supra note 178 and accompanying text. An organization may well decide that rather than 
lose federal funding, it will forego lobbying activities. Some case law suggests that conditions 
such as these are not coercive because the organization can elect not to take the funding. Supra 
note 79. This theory, however, is dated given the financial dependance of many organizations on 
federal funds. The effect of "coercive" conditions given this dependence is that organizations 
may elect to forego conduct conditioned upon the federal funds, even though it is constitutionally 
protected, rather than risk the loss of the funds altogether. 
269 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 513 
(1958). 
270 Although analysis of the Istook Amendment is futuristic as we have no ability to determine 
whether this legislation will ever pass, analysis is important for pointing out the potential power 
of Congress to impose unconstitutional conditions on organizations that can affect the content 
and extent of debate in government. 
271 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518. 
272 357 U.S. at 514-15. 
273 It is true that the proposed Istook Amendment does not preclude all lobbying by organi-
zations receiving federal funds as the Simpson Amendment does. See supra notes 218-19 and 
accompanying text. The restrictions contained in the Istook Amendment, along with already 
existing limitations in the tax code, so significantly limit the ability of organizations to lobby 
that they dilute, if they do not effectively silence, the message that these organizations want 
their lobbying activities to convey. See id.; supra notes 55--61 and accompanying text. This is 
exactly the type of free speech limitation that the First Amendment prohibits. Supra notes 
81-91 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Simpson Amendment); 
supra notes 218-19 (discussing the Istook Amendment). 
275 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 594-95, 597-98. 
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Speiser was that the condition imposed would have the effect of 
coercing the recipients of federal funds to refrain from engaging in 
constitutionally protected activities.276 This concern is implicated by 
both the Simpson and Istook Amendments. 
Organizations that fall under the restrictions in the Simpson and 
Istook Amendments are forced to make new choices about their 
status. Under the Simpson Amendment, organizations can give up 
federal funding and continue to lobby the government; they can keep 
their federal funds and reorganize under § 501(c)(3), subject to the 
substantial restrictions on their lobbying activities;277 or they can 
maintain their § 501(c)(4) status and federal funds but discontinue 
their lobbying activities. By reorganizing under § 501(c)(3), although 
organizations are not coerced into discontinuing their lobbying activi-
ties entirely, their lobbying activities are effectively curtailed under 
the limitations imposed by the tax code.278 The coercive effect of the 
Simpson Amendment is most dramatically revealed by the last option. 
If an organization wishes to maintain its § 501(c)(4) status and federal 
funding, the Simpson Amendment coerces the recipient into refrain-
ing from First Amendment activity.279 Following the Court's reason-
ing in Perry and Speiser, the Simpson Amendment unconstitutionally 
conditions the receipt of federal funds on free speech limitations.28o 
If Congress passes the Istook Amendment, nonprofit corporations 
organized under § 501(c)(3)281 that both receive federal funds and 
lobby the government would be subject to the substantial lobbying 
limitations inherent in their § 501(c)(3) status and the additional lob-
bying restrictions that the Istook Amendment would place on them.282 
Section 501(c)(3) organizations that wished to reorganize into a 
§ 501(c)(4) organization in order to avoid these limitations on lobbying 
would be foreclosed from doing so by the Simpson Amendment.283 The 
significant concern of both the Perry and Speiser Courts-that the 
condition imposed would have the effect of coercing the recipients of 
276 See id. at 594-95; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519. 
277 See supra notes 55-61. 
278 See supra note 268. 
279 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
280 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519. 
281 Section 501(c)(4) organizations that accepted federal funds would not be subject to the 
limitations in the Istook Amendment as they would already be precluded from engaging in 
lobbying by the Simpson Amendment. See supra Section IILA. 
282 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing tax code limitations); supra notes 
218-23 (discussing limitations in the Istook Amendment). 
283 See supra Section IILA. 
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federal funds from engaging in constitutionally protected activities-
is clearly realized with the Istook Amendment.284 
It is true that by allowing § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations 
to maintain tax-exempt status and by availing them federal funds, the 
government has granted a subsidy to these organizations.285 The fact 
that a subsidy has been granted, however, does not mean that the 
condition imposed is incapable of violating the First Amendment.286 
Recipients of federal subsidies retain fundamental constitutional 
rights.287 Congress could not have required all § 501(c)(3) and 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations to end their lobbying activities inde-
pendently of the federal grants bestowed on these organizations. 
Thus, Congress is producing a result that it could not command di-
rectly, an activity that the Supreme Court has specifically forbidden.288 
Like the constitutional violations in Perry and Speiser, the Simpson 
Amendment and the proposed Istook Amendment are likewise uncon-
stitutiona1.289 
Both the Simpson Amendment and the proposed Istook Amend-
ment are similar to the federal statute struck down by the United 
States Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Calif or-
nia.290 The statute in League of Women Voters, like the Simpson 
Amendment and the proposed Istook Amendment, prohibited recipi-
ents of federal funds from engaging in First Amendment activity, in 
this case editorializing.291 Like the Court in League of Women Voters, 
a court analyzing either the Simpson or Istook Amendments may 
weigh the constitutionality of the Amendments according to a balanc-
ing test.292 According to the legislative histories of both the Simpson 
and Istook Amendments, Congress felt that the governmental inter-
est implicated by the legislation was to prevent the use of taxpayer 
money in ways with which taxpayers may disagree.293 The Supreme 
284 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519. 
285 Section 501(c)(3) organizations receive a larger subsidy from the government as they are 
able to avoid paying taxes on income and to have donors deduct contributions to the organiza-
tions. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
286 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
287 [d.; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518. 
288 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
289 [d.; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518-19. 
290 See 468 U.S. 364, 392-93 (1984). 
291 See id. at 370 n.7. 
292 [d. at 383. 
293 See supra note 194. Advocates of the Simpson and Istook Amendments may try to argue 
that an additional governmental interest that the Amendments were directed at was to prevent 
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Court has specifically rejected this as a sufficient governmental in-
terest: 
[V]irtually every congressional appropriation will to some extent 
involve a use of public money as to which some taxpayers may 
object. Nevertheless, this does not mean that those taxpayers 
have a constitutionally protected right to enjoin such expendi-
tures. Nor can this interest be invoked to justify a congressional 
decision to suppress speech.294 
Like the statute in League of Women Voters, the Simpson and Istook 
Amendments are aimed at delegating funds only to those organiza-
tions whose political agenda is palatable to the majority party in 
control of Congress.295 A neutral court, however, will most likely find, 
like the Supreme Court did in League of Women Voters, that this 
governmental interest is not sufficient to justify a restriction on First 
Amendment activity.296 
B. The Simpson and Istook Amendments Are Not 
Governed by the Subsidy Line of Cases 
Proponents of the Simpson and Istook Amendments characterize 
the Amendments as constitutional under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Regan v. Taxation With Representation.297 Proponents of the 
Simpson Amendment would most likely argue that Congress was 
simply making a discretionary decision that it would not subsidize the 
lobbying activities of § 501(c)(4) nonprofits to the extent that it sub-
sidizes other activities.298 Reliance on Regan, however, is faulty. The 
Court in Regan was adjudicating whether Congress could, in its dis-
cretion, decide whether tax deductible contributions should be used 
organizations from having undue influence on government through the federal funds that they 
received. This argument is faulty. It may have been more on point if Congress had included 
groups like defense contractors within the reach of these Amendments. See supra note 241 and 
accompanying text. 
294 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 385 n.16. 
295Id. at 370 n.7. Both Amendments seem non-discriminatory because of their effect on all 
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations. In reality, many "non-liberal" organizations do not 
depend on federal funds to the extent that the more liberal groups do. Even if currently 
receiving some federal funds, these groups are more likely to be able to survive without the 
funds through corporate and individual fund raising efforts. The Simpson and Istook Amend-
ments will not affect the voice of these groups but will instead make them more pronounced 
since liberal groups who depend on federal funds may no longer be able to counter their opinions. 
296 See id. at 385 n.16. 
297 461 U.S. 540, 540 (1983). Analysis of the Amendments, opponents would most likely argue, 
is thus under the "subsidy" line of cases. Id.; Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 498 
(1959). 
298 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
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to subsidize lobbying activities of § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organiza-
tions.299 The Court thus analyzed the amount of discretion allowed to 
Congress when dealing with federal subsidies used to pay for lobby-
ing activities.300 As applied to the Simpson Amendment and the pro-
posed Istook Amendment, this reasoning is faulty because federal 
funds do not subsidize lobbying activities.301 All recipients of federal 
funds are precluded from using any federal funds to lobby.302 Federal 
funds do, however, subsidize the non-lobbying activities of the organi-
zation. Relying on Regan is misplaced because the government cannot 
use its discretion to condition subsidies for non-lobbying activity on 
the amount of lobbying activity that the organization is engaging in 
with its private funds.303 
In addition, the Court's opinion in Regan relied on the fact that 
although organizations that engaged in substantial lobbying were 
precluded from § 501(c)(3) status, these organizations were able to 
organize under § 501(c)(4) with unlimited ability to lobby.304 The Simp-
son Amendment closes the § 501(c)(4) avenue for nonprofit organiza-
tions noted in Regan.305 Under a strict reading ofthe Simpson Amend-
ment, organizations that receive federal funds and want to continue 
lobbying must organize under § 501(c)(3) and limit their lobbying 
activities according to the tests in the tax code.306 Similarly, if Con-
gress passes the Istook Amendment, § 501(c)(3) organizations who 
wish to escape the new limitations on political advocacy will be fore-
closed from re-organizing into § 501(c)(4) organizations to escape lob-
bying restrictions by the Simpson Amendment.307 
The Regan decision also makes note of the distinction between the 
use of private and public funds and the limits on the government's 
ability to regulate the use of an organization's private funds.3OB Nei-
ther the Simpson Amendment nor the proposed Istook Amendment 
make distinctions between an organization's use of private and public 
funds for lobbying.3°O Under both Amendments, if a § 501(c)(3) or a 
§ 501(c)(4) nonprofit receives federal funds, all of its funds, both pri-
299ld. at 543-44. 
300 See id. 
301 See supra notes 61.Hi7 and accompanying text. 
3021d. 
3031d. 
304 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544. 
300 See id.; supra Section UI.A. 
306 See supra Section UI.A; notes 55--61 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra Section UI.A. 
308 See Regan, 540 U.S. at 545, 553. 
309 See supra text accompanying note 191; notes 212-14 and accompanying text. 
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vate and public are tainted, unable to be used to lobby the govern-
ment. 
The Supreme Court has noted its disapproval of legislation that 
precludes recipients of federal benefits from using wholly private 
money.310 The Court in League of Women Voters specifically stated 
that it was troubled that the radio station was ''barred from using 
even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity."3B Like the 
statute in League of Women Voters, the Simpson Amendment and the 
proposed Istook Amendment preclude nonprofit organizations from 
using either public or private funds to engage in First Amendment 
activity.312 In addition, the Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan reiter-
ated the Court's disapproval of restrictions on privately funded activ-
ity.313 The Court in Rust found the statute conditioning federal funds 
on a ban on abortion-related activity constitutional as long as grantees 
were not precluded from engaging in abortion-related activities with 
private funds, in a separate capacity.314 
The legislative history of the Simpson Amendment cites the possi-
bility for a dual structure similar to the hypothetical structure in the 
Court's decision in Rust.315 This dual structure would allow recipients 
to set up two § 501(c)(4) organizations, one for federally funded non-
lobbying activity and the other for privately funded lobbying activ-
ity.316 This change in structure would allow recipients of federal funds 
to engage in lobbying activities as long as they were separate and 
distinct from the organization's non-lobbying arm, similar to the 
Court's hypothetical structure in Rust.317 If Congress were to enact 
the Istook Amendment, recipients of federal funds within the ambit 
of the Amendment could also attempt to utilize the segregation rea-
soning in Rust.318 Under this reasoning, organizations could segregate 
their lobbying activities into a wholly separate entity, whether 
§ 501(c)(3) or § 501(c)(4).319 
The requirement for segregation set out in Rust, however, may put 
insurmountable roadblocks in the way of the ability of § 501(c)(3) and 
310 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984). 
311 Id. 
312 Supra text accompanying note 191; notes 212-14 and accompanying text. 
313 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197-98 (1991). 
314 See id. 
315 See id; supra notes 204-05. 
316 Supra notes 204-05. 
317 See 500 U.S. at 197-98. 
318Id. 
319 See id. 
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§ 501(c)(4) organizations to exercise their free speech rights.320 The 
situation that these organizations face by having to segregate their 
activities into two different organizations is similar to that in Federal 
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life where a 
statute that served to discourage free speech in this manner was an 
"infringement on First Amendment activities."321 Similarly, the Simp-
son Amendment and the proposed Istook Amendment, while not 
foreclosing all avenues for the organization to use its private funds,322 
create a situation that serves to discourage the exercise of free 
speech.323 
The number of roadblocks that the segregation requirement would 
put in the way of an organization engaging in free speech is somewhat 
undetermined. The Rust opinion does not say to what extent an 
organization must segregate its activities in order to satisfy the 
Court.324 For example, the opinion leaves open questions such as 
whether the lobbying arm of the organization can share employees 
with the non-lobbying arm.325 In addition, both the Simpson Amend-
ment and the proposed Istook Amendment would result in increased 
administrative costs, a significant roadblock for all organizations. Not 
only would § 501(c)(4) organizations have to file extensive paperwork 
as a condition of § 501(c)(4) status but they would also have to file 
additional paperwork to comply with the Simpson Amendment.326 If 
the organization were to utilize the dual structure, the amount of 
paperwork would double.327 If Congress were to pass the Istook 
Amendment, § 501(c)(3) organizations that also receive federal grants 
would also be subject to increased administrative costs. If § 501(c)(3) 
organizations desired to keep their federal funds, they would have to 
carefully police an of their lobbying activity in order to comply both 
with the § 501(c)(3) limitations imposed by the tax code and with the 
potential new limitations imposed by the Istook Amendment.328 In 
320 See id. 
321 See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 254-55 
(1986). 
322 Under the Simpson Amendment, organizations can still go to a § 501(c)(3) organization or 
create a dually structured organization. 
323 Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 254-55. 
324 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 173. 
325 See id. A requirement such as this would put significant roadblocks in the way of smaller 
organizations that may only have a few employees. 
326 See supra Section IILA. 
327 [d. 
328 See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
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addition, the proposed Istook Amendment would subject organiza-
tions to lawsuits by the government and individuals for any violations 
of the Amendment.329 
When faced with the number and complexity of the limitations that 
organizations must comply with under already existing tax code regu-
lations and those imposed by either the Simpson Amendment or the 
proposed Istook Amendment, organizations may very well decide to 
forego lobbying activity in order to reduce administrative costs or 
reduce their risk of loss of the federal funds. Although both the 
Simpson Amendment and the proposed Istook Amendment allow for 
avenues by which organizations can continue very limited amounts of 
lobbying, these limitations effectively frustrate the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.330 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has addressed the serious constitutional issues that 
arise when the government attaches conditional strings to federal 
benefits. This Comment has recognized that the government has some 
ability to attach conditions to benefits. The point that it illustrates is 
that the government cannot use its vast powers to attach strings to 
benefits that frustrate the ability of the recipient to engage in consti-
tutionally protected activity. Lobbying is a fundamental and impor-
tant part of the political agenda of many nonprofit organizations, 
particularly environmental groups. Without the ability to lobby effec-
tively, the voice of groups who strive to preserve and strengthen 
environmental laws in this country will be diluted, if not lost entirely. 
This outcome strengthens the voice of industrial lobbyists and may 
result in the scale-back of current environmental laws and a morato-
rium on new laws aimed at preserving the environment. 
329 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. 
330 See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 253-54 
(1986). 
